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ABSTRACT 
 
STUNTED GROWTH: INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE DEPARTMENT 
OF  HOMELAND SECURITY‘S MATURATION 
 
 
 
By 
Dana Fronczak 
May 2013 
 
Thesis supervised by Dr. Lewis Irwin 
Scholars have proposed numerous explanations as to why the Department of 
Homeland Security has struggled to mature as an organization and effectively conduct its 
core mission. We propose an alternative viewpoint that the department lacks key legal 
authorities and necessitates key organizational transfer in order to rationalize its portfolio. 
We examine these points through review of legal authorities in select mission areas and 
through a resource analysis of activities conducted throughout the federal government to 
execute the homeland security mission. The analysis leads to specific recommendations 
for transfers and authorities and suggestions as to how the political environment might 
coalesce around engendering these changes. 
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I. Introduction 
Drug Interdiction. Infrastructure Assessments. Commodities Stockpiling. Disaster 
Response Search and Rescure. Currency Investigations. Passenger Screening. Cyber 
Security. Immigrant Processing.Virus Detection. Communications Interoperability. 
Border Checkpoints. 
What do these seemingly incoherent functions have to do with one another? They 
are all responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the enormous 
government agency created in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. In the course 
of one day, DHS screens over 2 million people at over 300 international and domestic 
airports; it will also screen 71,000 cargo containers at sea and land ports; it will 
apprehend 1,983 people who cross the border illegally and accept more than 3,200 who 
become legal citizens
1
. It will analyze and try to prevent cyber attacks, prepare for 
emerging natural hazards such as hurricanes and earthquakes and protect the President, 
Vice-President and any visiting heads of state from harm
2
.  
 Melded from 22 federal agencies and 170,000 employees, DHS assumed 
responsibility for an enormous number of diverse and complex missions, a portfolio that 
requires a widely dispersed focus. The department further expanded its missions and 
functions in its first seven years due to mandates from Congress and the Office of the 
President. The Department now comprises over a dozen different components and over 
216,000 employees
3
.    
In addition to its own resources, DHS requires the cooperation of an enormous 
number of other federal agencies, state and local governments and private-sector partners. 
All of this must happen in order to get the ―homeland security‖ mission right‘ 
2 
 
consequently, at times there are overlapping and sometimes conflicting roles within that 
panoply of groups.  
But that‘s not all DHS does. 
Collecting tariff revenue. Protecting against exploited children. Polar icebreaking. 
Training other federal agents. Environmental cleanups. Recreational boating safety. 
Preventing international piracy. Another set of missions that belong to DHS, in some 
capacity, but ones that don‘t fit easily with protecting the United States from a terrorist 
attack and responding when a catastrophic event occurs.  These also require coordination, 
money and effort. In many cases DHS is required by law to carry them out. In fact, when 
the Department was created, it was specifically charged to maintain the functions of the 
agencies and subdivisions within the Department that are not related directly to securing 
the homeland
4
.  
All of the DHS missions, whether core ―homeland security‖ missions or not, are 
completed under the glare of public, political and media scrutiny. These missions are also 
completed under the sometimes conflicting principles of preserving freedom and 
facilitating the free flow of commerce while ensuring safety and security. 
The department has suffered nearly constant criticism for its handling of many 
key events, most notably its response after the city of New Orleans‘s levee system failed 
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, which was seen as a manifestation of the Department‘s 
failure to take its disaster preparedness, response and recovery mission seriously
5
 
6
. But 
other issues, including its struggles to secure the United States‘ borders, effective 
screening of airport passengers, apprehending and removing illegal immigrants, and 
disseminating grants to state and local entities to prepare for a terrorist attack have also 
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come under controversy. In part because of these problems, the department has both 
instituted and been subjected to numerous reorganizations in its short history
7
. 
As DHS approaches its tenth anniversary, many of these inherent challenges 
persist. Various reasons are touted for why DHS has failed to mature and coalesce into a 
single unified coordinator for homeland security activities. One of the reasons cited is the 
department‘s inability to effectively manage its own resources, resulting in the 
department‘s inclusion on the Government Accountability Office‘s biennial ―High-Risk‖ 
list since the department was created 
8
 
9
 
10
 
11. Another reason cited is the department‘s 
lack of progress in integrating its legacy organizational cultures, resulting in a collection 
of agencies rather than an integrated department.
12
 Yet another possible cause identified 
is the widely dispersed oversight by over 100 Congressional committees, which forces 
the department to spend an inordinate amount of resources compared to other agencies 
preparing and responding to Congressional inquiry
13
 
14
.    
These points (Congressional oversight, internal barriers, lack of DHS managerial 
acumen) have been cited in legislative and policy circles as reasons for the department‘s 
failures, but there potentially lies a more fundamental capability in order to truly carry 
out its mission. The crucial decisions about what organizations would comprise the 
department and what authorities the department would be given were made in the nascent 
days of its creation, and have largely not been revisited since the DHS was created in 
2003.  
The thesis of this paper is that the department lacks key legal authorities and 
requires key organizational transfers, both to add and remove functions, that would create 
a more robust and comprehensive homeland security capability. In order for the 
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department to truly reach maturity, it must engage in another ―rationalizing‖ set of 
activities, one that examines both legal and organizational barriers to success. 
 
Figure 1 – Original Composition of DHS, January 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
II. Paper Structure 
DHS was created in order to coordinate the disparate efforts of the ―homeland 
security enterprise,‖ the various stakeholders that contribute to the collective security of 
the United States
15
. As an organization, DHS still lacks the necessary authorities to 
coordinate the various homeland security functions strewn throughout the federal 
government, the states, cities and the private sector. In addition, the department‘s own 
organizations lack key capabilities that are essential to fulfilling the five missions 
articulated in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
16
, modeled after the 
Department of Defense‘s quadrennial review commenced after the Cold War17. In turn, 
the legislation that codified the DHS retained responsibility for numerous functions that 
have no homeland security nexus. The theory proposed is that the department can only 
evolve so far unless these fundamental issues are addressed. In essence, the department‘s 
ability to thrive is ―stunted‖ by these institutional hindrances.          
In order to better understand the challenges that DHS faces defining its role, a 
short history lesson is beneficial in order to examine the decision-making process that led 
to agencies and authorities‘ inclusion and exclusion. Examining the department‘s 
evolution from a White House Office of Homeland Security into a full federal department 
illustrates the decisions made within the context of the political and policymaking 
environment that now hinder the department‘s coordination of homeland security threats 
and allowed for the inheritance of many non-homeland security functions. This will also 
be conducted using some theoretical constructs about how the bureaucracy is developed, 
molded and altered.  
6 
 
The next step is to examine the Department‘s core missions as recently defined by 
its Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and examine specifically what authorities 
(and correspondingly, what authorities it lacks) it holds to conduct those missions. As 
mentioned previously, homeland security involves an enormous level of effort from state 
and local governments, the private sector and non-governmental organizations
18
 In many 
cases, DHS must persuade or negotiate with those organizations to comply with its 
standards or recommendations, rather than possessing the power of regulatory authority 
or legislation to compel them. 
Next, we will look at the department‘s current organizational structure, and 
contrast it with the dollars and organizations used for homeland security purposes. This 
can be done utilizing the Office of Management and Budget‘s Organizing the Budget for 
Homeland Security, published as part of the annual budget. For the budget year 2010, a 
total of $70 billion dollars was appropriated for homeland security activities across 32 
agencies as diverse as the Department of Commerce and the Social Security 
Administration
19
. These appropriations will be examined in depth to review what 
homeland security functions reside within the department and what functions reside 
outside in other federal agencies. Lastly, based on these analyses, recommendations shall 
be offered in order to bolster the department‘s organizational structure and authorities. 
These recommendations shall include both additions and potential subtractions to the 
department in order to more properly align resources with their most appropriate 
organization, as well as potential changes in legal authorities.  
7 
 
It is acknowledged up front that these changes are fraught with political 
difficulties, and they cannot happen overnight. With that caveat in mind, included are 
specific thoughts for how some of these changes might be implemented.          
   
II. Homeland Polity: DHS’s Formulation 
 
President George W. Bush announced the creation of a White House Office of 
Homeland Security 11 days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon
20
. Bush appointed Tom Ridge, then the Governor of Pennsylvania, as its 
Director. ―Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local 
governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be 
coordinated at the highest level,‖ Bush said.21 However, this simple declaration for the 
unified coordination of 40 different agencies with Homeland Security responsibilities 
belied the internal struggles, presidential recalcitrance and eventual dramatic turnaround 
that culminated with the creation of a Cabinet-level department in January, 2003.   
An effort to establish a National Homeland Security Agency was first introduced 
before the 9/11 attacks by Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX)
22
. The agency Thornberry 
envisioned would have reported to the National Security Council and not been 
established as a Cabinet-level agency. Thornberry‘s also envisioned a significantly 
smaller organizational merger than the agency that was eventually founded in 2003. His 
bill only included the United States Coast Guard 9(then a part of the United States 
Department of Transportation, the Border Patrol (a part of the United States Treasury), 
the U.S. Customs Service (also a part of the Treasury), the Federal Emergency 
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Management Agency and several infrastructure security offices located in the Department 
of Commerce and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  
The National Homeland Security Agency‘s makeup was borne out of a report 
from a panel known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, which transmitted its findings to 
Congress in February of 2001.  The work of the Commission originated in 1998 in 
response to the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the 1995 bombing 
of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City. In its research, the 
Commission concluded that over 40 entities contributed to homeland security at that time 
and that, first and foremost, the disparate functions required a ―culture of coordinated 
strategic planning to permeate all U.S. national security institutions.
23
 While the 
Commission did propose several structural changes in the national security bureaucracy, 
including the ones that Thornberry adopted in his bill, it left much of the apparatus alone. 
The White House initially took a more conservative approach. Vice-President 
Dick Cheney, in response to the Commission‘s report, established a ―National 
Preparedness Review‖ that focused on a terrorist attack utilizing a weapon of mass 
destruction.24  The review did not begin until a few days before the 9/11 attacks occurred, 
and was quickly superseded by the White House‘s establishment of an Office of 
Homeland Security in October of 2001.
25
  The office intended to develop a national 
strategy for homeland security but did not intend to move any agencies out of their 
existing organizational structures.
26
 After the attacks, Bush appointed Tom Ridge, the 
governor of Pennsylvania, to the position of homeland security advisor and the head of 
the newly created office within the Executive Office of the President. 
9 
 
Almost concurrently, Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT, but then a Democrat) 
introduced a bill In October 2001 to create a Cabinet-level agency that included a set of 
organizations comparable to Thornberry‘s. Lieberman‘s bill was met with skepticism by 
the White House
27; Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer stated that ―Creating a cabinet post 
doesn‘t solve the problem‖28, and the White House continued to oppose the creation of a 
new department for several months after the 9/11 attacks.
29
  
While Lieberman‘s bill sought to establish a Cabinet-level agency, Senator Bob 
Graham (D-Florida) introduced a bill to transfer the White House office of Homeland 
Security into a National Office for Combating Terrorism.
30
 Graham‘s recommendation 
was based upon a study developed by the Gilmore Commission, chaired by former 
Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore. The Gilmore Commission produced five reports on 
an annual basis from 1999 until 2003. The commission recommended a White House 
Office with a coordinator that would be appointed by the Senate. 
Despite the differences in the proposals, over the next several months a coalition 
formed in the Legislature to create a new Cabinet-level agency. Calculating that it would 
lose a battle with Congress over the creation of a new department,
31
  the administration 
shifted gears and began to quietly formulate a proposal of its own to create a Cabinet-
level Homeland Security agency.
32
    
The department was formed by a small set of actors within the Bush 
administration.
33
 One of the legislative requests the Bush White House made involved 
reasserting its ability to reorganize. Initially developed via a 1934 statute and altered via a 
Supreme Court decision involving the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 
authority had expired in 1984.
34
 
10 
 
In summary level, President Bush‘s vision of a new department incorporated a 
series of directorates that organized the 22 agencies into a series of Directorates: 
Management, Science and Technology, Border and Transportation Security, Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness and Response, each 
run by an Under Secretary. However, several organizations and offices would also report 
directly to the Secretary, including the United States Coast Guard and the United States 
Secret Service, which each retained status as a ―distinct entity‖ within the organizational 
structure
35
. 
Bush introduced his plan for a Department of Homeland Security on June 18, 
2002, and subsequently released his National Strategy for Homeland Security one month 
later.
36
 Bush‘s proposal was sponsored by Rep. Dick Armey (R-Tex) and introduced to 
the House of Representatives on June 24, 2002
37
. The bill was quickly approved by the 
house and approved by the Senate in November, 2002. President Bush signed it into law 
on November, 25, 2002.  
This history provides the factual elements of the department‘s formulation. In examining 
the history, a few observations emerge. First, the impetus to change homeland defense 
was undertaken at first via a slow bureaucratic process that was then dramatically 
interrupted by the introduction of a crisis.  Second, once that crisis occurred, many 
competing interests, both individual and institutional, desired to change the structure of 
homeland security, with each individual or institution attempting to suit the bureaucratic 
realignment to their interests and authorities. This notion of ―turf‖ was tantamount, and it 
manifested itself in a secretive and exclusionary alignment process that was essentially 
conducted by five individuals within the White House
38
 Led by White House Chief of 
11 
 
Staff Andrew Card, those included Vice-president Richard Cheney, Ridge, national 
security adviser Condoleezza Rice, director of the office of Management and Budget 
Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. and Cheney Chief of Staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby.
39
 
Within that process, many organizations were deemed politically infeasible for 
transfer, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Guard
40
. Third, 
once the crisis occurred, the proceedings to create what was the largest government 
reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947 happened in dramatically quick 
fashion when compared to the usual pace of government change. 
The next section provides a literature review of the theoretical foundations of 
bureaucratic change and applies those foundations to the specific mechanics of the 
formulation of DHS.    
 
III. Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
Only nine years old, analyses of DHS are somewhat limited, and have decreased 
in the last few years as attention has been pulled away in security think-tanks from 
homeland security back towards international security issues such as Afghanistan and the 
emergence of China as strategic adversary. Government think-tanks and oversight reports 
from entities such as the Government Accountability Office provide some perspective on 
the department‘s challenges, but primarily focus on the department‘s internal issues41 42.  
However, Congressional dispersal of legislative authority in the context of newly created 
agencies and the reorganization of the government as a response to a policy crisis in not 
unusual; useful lessons can be gleaned from other government reorganizations and, more 
12 
 
generally, the perspectives of scholars who have studied policy formulation in the federal 
government.    
Typically in the American bureaucracy, the formulation of government agencies 
has occurred for four different reasons: some were foundational agencies that constituted 
essential government functions (the Departments of State and Treasury); some were 
created in response to needs of growth (the Departments of Justice and Interior); others 
were created because of specific ―clientele‖ (the Departments of Agriculture and Labor 
for farmers and industrial laborers, respectively); still others were created in response to 
specific national priorities (the Departments of Health and Human Services and Housing 
and Urban Development)
43
 
44
.   
DHS was created in response to a national crisis rather than any one of the 
aforementioned reasons, specifically a terrorist attack. The notion of terrorism was 
certainly not new to the United States; the first real operational definition of terrorism in 
United States law  was established in 1996; it established terrorism as ―intimidation or 
coercion or to retaliate against government conduct‖45. Terrorist attacks involving 
American citizen victims had previously been enacted a number of times, including 
foreign actors in international arenas (airplane hijackings and embassy bombings such as 
the near-simultaneous attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-Es-
Salaam, Tanzania in 1998), foreign actors in domestic arenas (the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing) or domestic actors in domestic arenas (the bombing of the Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK, in 1995 by militia member Timothy McVeigh).  
More specifically, Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization led by Osama Bin Laden, 
had been identified in the mid-1980‘s as a nascent threat, even before the end of the Cold 
13 
 
War
46
. The recognition of Al Qaeda as a global threat, among other, initiated the series of 
commissions and reports described in the previous section. 
None of these events or revelations, however, led to the widespread call for a 
reorganization of the government. Clearly the attacks on the World Trade Center, 
Pentagon, and the failed attack by a fourth plane that crash-landed in Shanksville, PA did 
promulgate that call. An event such as the 9/11 attacks is referred to a ―policy 
disruption,‖ a moment in time where a significant event presents a challenge and an 
opportunity to recalibrate the approach to a particular issue
47
. Scholars also refer to this 
type of disruption as a ―punctuated equilibrium‖ theory of policymaking, where a 
pressing issue results in a period of instability. During these unstable windows, new 
institutional structures emerge that often remain in place for long periods of time
48
. The 
smaller events that preceded 9/11, however, were not sufficiently disruptive to puncture 
the existing homeland defense/ homeland security structure and promulgate legislative 
change
49
    
Some of the more recent government agency formations have been instituted in 
order to provide a coordinating function after a period of instability occurred, though 
none was created with nearly as drastic a punctuated equilibrium as 9/11. The 
Department of Energy was formulated in 1977 as both a coordinating function as well as 
a response to a policy disruption, that being an energy crisis that produced an economic 
recession. The Energy department evolved from a White House Federal Energy office to 
a Federal Energy Administration and, finally, to a Cabinet-level agency.
50
   
This period of instability can also be referred to as a ―policy window;‖ policy 
windows emerge when a problem is identified, solutions are available, and institutional 
14 
 
inertia is surmountable.
51
 In situations where the policy window is created by a crisis, 
typically the policy window has a short lifespan
52
 
53
. The attacks of 9/11 proved the 
exception, not the rule, due to the seminal nature of the event and more importantly, the 
huge opportunity for potential change in authorities and structures that 9/11 afforded.  As 
the history shows, despite Kingdon‘s and Downs‘ assertions that policy windows borne 
of crises happen in a short period, it took well over 18 months from 9/11 to a newly 
formed DHS, yet it was created. 
During ―policy windows,‖ the differing federal branches (executive, legislative) 
each attempt to reformulate the existing structure(s) in such a way as to increase their 
sphere of control. Wise asserts that there are three distinct ways that this occurs: 
executive order coordination, a statutory coordinator and full Congressional control.
54
  
Through executive order coordination, presidential leadership tends to try and 
centralize command and control of the institutions responsible for tackling the disruption. 
This is most often executed via the use of policy czars and other coordinating bodies.
55
 
56
. 
This was President Bush‘s first approach when he established a White House office of 
Homeland Security with Gov. Ridge as its head. A vital necessity for executive order 
coordination is executive activism; the White House must be willing to vigilantly provide 
policy direction, enforce that direction via the threat of reducing resources and mitigate 
disputes between bureaucratic entities; otherwise, fragmentation will occur
57
.    
As previously discussed, the Gilmore commission had previously advocated for 
something in between a White House declared office and a full-fledged Cabinet agency. 
In this framework, referred to as a ―statutory coordinator,‖ Congress establishes by law a 
coordinating body within the White House, but because it is established by statute, 
15 
 
Congress retains significant oversight authority
58
 Congress‘ motivation was one of 
control; if Homeland Security were housed within the White House, Congress would lack 
the ability to confirm a Departmental head via the Senate and experience a decreased 
ability to influence policymaking via the committee process.  
The third option, Congressional control, would manifest itself in the creation of an 
entirely new agency where both the creation and continuation of programs (authorization) 
and the funding of programs (appropriation) would be controlled by the legislature. In 
this scenario, House and Senate committees retained their oversight over the individual 
functions of the proposed department. 
 This scenario, of course, eventually won the day. The obvious question is: why 
did it win? One definite reason was that the President recognized politically that 
Congress held the votes to establish a Cabinet-level agency and therefore relented.  
However, the more structural reason is that a policy window had opened; a 
problem had been identified (terrorism on American soil) solutions were available (the 
concept of a DHS or something like it had already been circulated), and institutional 
inertia was surmountable. Government‘s tendency to offer a previously formulated 
solution with existing support to address a current problem59 meant that the concept of a 
DHS, even though it was the President‘s, was quickly moved for approval by the 
Congress. Also, the uniquely traumatic occurrence of multiple attacks on American soil 
meant that by seizing the initiation of a DHS, the executive branch, while ceding the 
concept of Congressional control, could more effectively control the elements and the 
legislative edicts that comprised the new department. 
16 
 
The government now had a huge reorganization on its hands, a situation in which 
success depended on numerous factors, including degrees of organizational attention and 
the ways different players perceive the problems and opportunities
60
. The force with 
which a new bureaucratic institution alters or influences the existing system plays a major 
role in how effective the response is to a policy disruption. That force, however, is 
challenged by existing system dynamics. When those dynamics are disrupted by new 
problems or institutions, the tendency is for institutions to act resilient and resistant to 
significant changes
61
 
62
. Existing organizations already possessed homeland security 
capabilities and, as the history shows, loathed to give that capability away to a new entity.      
 The merger of the Armed Forces offers a case study. After the end of the Second 
World War, the War Department submitted a plan to organize the Armed Forces under a 
single coordinating structure. The Army and the Navy voiced support and resistance, 
respectively, based upon the impacts a reorganization would have on their autonomy.
63
 
Autonomy is the notion that an organization enjoys relatively well-defined domains and 
can execute its mission in a space that allows an organization to develop effectively
64
. 
Within a government organization, high effectiveness tends to occur when agencies hold 
goals that are popular, engage in simple tasks, don‘t have a lot of bureaucratic rivals and 
possess minimal constraints. More informally, this is called ―turf.‖ Normally a pejorative 
term, ―turf‖ can also be viewed as an appropriate assertion of authority over a subject 
matter to which an entity holds responsibility.     
The Army believed that a unified command structure would benefit its autonomy 
because it feared that the emergence of nuclear deterrence as a military strategy would 
lessen the need for ground troops and infantry support, obviously its bellwethers. In turn, 
17 
 
the Navy opposed a unified command because its organizational structure provided it 
both an independent force of ground troops (The Marines) and, more importantly, its own 
air unit (naval aviation). Reorganization and the presumed examination of resource 
alignments would put the Navy‘s autonomy at risk, it believed.  
Eventually a structure was formed that largely satisfied everyone‘s desires to 
maintain autonomy; it created a formally unified defense department structure but 
provided little authority to the Secretary of Defense; in fact, the bureaucracy increased 
via the introduction of a Department of the Air Force
65.What didn‘t happen was any type 
of systematic recalibration of resources based on the delineation of missions.  
To synopsize these different theoretical lenses in the context of the formation of 
the Homeland Security department brings us to the following summary: the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 represented a ―punctuated equilibrium,‖ or ―policy disruption.‖ This led to 
a ―policy window,‖ which was initially met with an organization (the White House office 
of Homeland Security) created under the tenet of ―White House control.‖ However, that 
‗policy window‖ remained open enough, due to the magnanimity of the event, that 
―Congressional Control,‖ via the creation of a Cabinet-level agency, became the eventual 
reality. The White House, however, in a bit of political gamesmanship, introduced its 
own Homeland Security department prior to the passage of any legislation, and this 
concept became the choice of all parties, with its previously discussed inclusions and 
exclusions. This choice has led to consequences in the execution of the homeland security 
mission, intended or unintended. DHS lacks ―turf,‖ the hypothesis of this paper asserts 
based on the definition provided above. It cannot assert authority because it both lacks 
18 
 
the legislative mandates to do so and because it lacks control over many of the 
organizational assets needed to most effectively conduct its mission. 
The next section of this paper will examine the results of this organizational 
transformation through two lenses; first, a series of key functional areas will be analyzed 
in terms of the current authorities granted to DHS and the agency‘s effectiveness within 
those functional areas. Second, we will examine federal expenditures of homeland 
security as a whole, to determine where the resources are allocated for the function across 
the federal government, and what that means for the effectiveness of the mission.  
  
V. Authorities and Bureaucracies 
   
 DHS emerged via the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and was touted as the 
answer to America‘s need to prevent future terrorist attacks inside the United States. But 
as previously indicated, a number of choices were instituted in its formulation and early 
history that have impacted its ability to execute its Congressionally stated missions.    
In examining the authorities granted to the DHS, an examination of the 
department‘s current missions, goals and objectives provides a useful lens. Congress 
chartered DHS to specifically prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 
America‘s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the impact and recover from attacks 
that do occur
66
. However, the department inherited a host of agencies whose missions 
comprise broader edicts than simply preventing, protecting and responding to terrorist 
attacks. As part of a belated effort that was mandated in the Homeland Security Act, DHS 
completed its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) in 2009.  The 
19 
 
prevention of terrorism was but one element of securing the homeland defined in the 
QHSR; securing America‘s borders, enforcing immigration laws, responding to and 
recovering from natural, technological or hostile disasters and securing cyberspace have 
all emerged as distinct missions. The Department also compartmentalized the other 
functions that it inherited as part of the reorganization that created DHS into a sixth 
functional area.
67
 
 
Table/Chart 1 – Missions and Goals of the Department of Homeland Security 
identified during the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security 
 
• Goal 1.1: Prevent Terrorist Attacks 
• Goal 1.2: Prevent the Unauthorized Acquisition or Use of Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials and Capabilities 
• Goal 1.3: Manage Risks to Critical Infrastructure, Key Leadership, and 
Events 
 
Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Borders 
 
• Goal 2.1: Effectively Control U.S. Air, Land, and Sea Borders 
• Goal 2.2: Safeguard Lawful Trade and Travel 
• Goal 2.3: Disrupt and Dismantle Transnational Criminal 
Organizations 
 
Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws 
 
• Goal 3.1: Strengthen and Effectively Administer the Immigration 
System 
• Goal 3.2: Prevent Unlawful Immigration 
 
Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace 
20 
 
 
• Goal 4.1: Create a Safe, Secure, and Resilient Cyber Environment 
• Goal 4.2: Promote Cybersecurity Knowledge and Innovation 
Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters 
 
• Goal 5.1: Mitigate Hazards 
• Goal 5.2: Enhance Preparedness 
• Goal 5.3: Ensure Effective Emergency Response 
• Goal 5.4: Rapidly Recover 
 
 
Source: Department of Homeland Security Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
 
Table/Chart 2 – Additional Goals 
Functional Area 6: Providing Essential Support to National and 
Economic Security 
 
• Goal 6.1: Collect Customs Revenue and Enforce Import/Export   
Controls 
• Goal 6.2: Ensure Maritime Safety and Environmental Stewardship 
• Goal 6.3: Conduct and Support Other Law Enforcement Activities 
• Goal 6.4:  Provide Specialized National Defense Capabilities 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Homeland Security Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
 
Using this mission structure, we can examine a number of specific areas and 
examine whether the requisite authorities exist to effectively execute its stated goals. 
Intelligence 
 
In examining the mission structure at the objective level, we find that the very 
first objective of the department is to Understand the Threat, under the mission of 
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Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security. ―Understand‖ in this context primarily 
relates to intelligence gathering and dissemination. Intelligence forms the basis of two  
other objectives within the mission structure, within Goals 1.2  (Prevent the Unauthorized 
Acquisition or Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials) and 
Goal 4.1 (Create a Safe, Secure, and Resilient Cyber Environment)
68
 
When the department was created, it initially formed a Directorate for Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP). The Information Analysis arm of that 
organization was pulled out and made into its own Office of Intelligence and Analysis in 
2005 as part of the Department‘s Second Stage Review,69 in an attempt to centralize the 
coordination and dissemination of intelligence products to state and local law 
enforcement. However, an examination of the authorities in the Homeland Security Act 
reveals inherent limitations  
 The Homeland Security Act specifically calls for the Information Analysis 
portion of the Directorate to ―access, receive and analyze law enforcement information, 
intelligence information and other information from Agencies of the Federal 
Government,‖ then aggregate and analyze these pieces of data for state and local issues70. 
At approximately the same time, a report released by a joint Congressional committee 
recommended that DHS establish an ―all-source terrorism fusion center‖ that would 
amalgamate ―raw‖ data, analyze it, package it, and disseminate it to state and local 
entities
71
. The law makes no mention of the department establishing its own intelligence 
gathering capability; instead, it renders the DHS specifically reliant on other agencies to 
furnish intelligence that it then can analyze and disseminate to state and local authorities. 
The Department primarily relies on open source data, and typically does not engage in 
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the more widely recognized actions related to international intelligence gathering, such as 
signals and imagery intelligence
72
. 
In addition to furnishing no organic intelligence capability within the DHS, the 
legislation also offers vague protocols for DHS obtaining ―raw‖ information. On one 
hand, the Homeland Security Act indicates that the Secretary of DHS must specifically 
request information from other agencies, while a subsequent passage indicates that other 
agencies, despite a lack of a specific request, ―shall promptly provide to the Secretary‖ all 
materials related to threats against the United States.   
Furthermore, because no explicit authorities were established granting the 
department a central role in either the development of domestic intelligence or in the 
coordination and integration of existing agencies‘ domestic intelligence, other agencies 
filled the department‘s power vacuum. After 9/11, the FBI reacted swiftly to change its 
primary focus from law enforcement to counterterrorism
73
. At the same time Congress 
deliberated the formation of DHS, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Robert Mueller, announced the creation of a Directorate of Intelligence as part of a 
significant reorganization to emphasize counterterrorism.
74
 This Office of Intelligence 
would be created in order to assist in ―pulling together bits and pieces of information that 
often comes from separate sources;‖ the Department of Justice dedicated millions of 
dollars to hiring and training more intelligence analysts
75
.  
The FBI, in fact, has acknowledged that since 9/11, it has shifted many of its 
resources and focus from law enforcement to terrorism, increasing its prosecutions for 
terrorism and national security cases by over 800 percent.
76
  
23 
 
There is no single domestic intelligence agency in the United States; unlike 
foreign intelligence, which relies on a few key players (the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the National Security Agency), domestic intelligence initiates at a variety of differing 
levels. Federal law enforcement agencies (most predominantly the FBI), as well as state 
and local law enforcement play key roles, as well as the owner/operators of private sector 
critical infrastructure. This coterie of law enforcement organizations and critical 
infrastructure owner/operators numbers in the thousands.
77
 Therefore, much of the ability 
of the Department of Homeland Security to identify threats to the homeland depends on 
the intelligence-gathering and disseminating capabilities of other agencies, though the 
Office of I&A office does gather some intelligence from DHS operational components 
such as the Coast Guard, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and US Customs 
and Border Protection.
78
  
The department has attempted to integrate the intelligence and operational aspects 
of homeland security through a concept known as fusion centers. The stated goal of 
fusion centers is to ‗blend relevant law enforcement and intelligence information analysis 
and Coordinate security measures to reduce threats in their communities
79
. Fusion centers 
began as an attempt to link federal, state and  local resources in one environment in order 
to expand the traditional subjects of state and local intelligence (domestic and 
transnational crime including drugs,  prostitution, and  other organized criminal activity) 
and into acts of terrorism.  
However, fusion centers have struggled to obtain federal resources from the 
interagency, despite support from DHS in the form of grants to the states (ibid), although 
information sharing appears to be trending in the right direction
80
.  The I&A office still 
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lacks a permanent presence in many fusion centers, unlike the Department of Justice, 
which has located staff at all fusion centers since 2007
81
; in addition, DHS operational 
components often neglect to share information with the fusion centers, instead relying on 
local relationships established outside of this formal information sharing construct
82
.  
Even though the recommendations from the House Joint Committee on 
Intelligence recommended establishing an intelligence coordination center within the 
newly created department, President Bush instead chose to build a Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center within the Central Intelligence Agency in 2003
83
.  A year later, 
primary coordination for domestic terrorism issues fell to the National Counterterrorism 
Center under the control of the Director for National Intelligence, which was created as 
an attempt to coordinate the efforts of all 16 agencies with intelligence capabilities, now 
known as the ―Intelligence Community‖84 85. Although Intelligence and Analysis is a 
member of the intelligence community, DHS, again, must obtain information from other, 
more well-developed intelligence capabilities as opposed to generating its own
86
.    
 The ability of the department to act on information is hindered by its ability to 
quickly gather that information for its progenitors. This challenge was clearly 
demonstrated in the bombing attempt on Christmas Day, 2009. Umar Farouk 
Abdulmattalab, a Nigerian national, boarded a plane in Yemen bound for Detroit. As the 
plane approached the Detroit airport, Abdulmattalab attempted to light a homemade 
incendiary device onboard the plane. His plan was thwarted by alert passengers.  
An initial investigation by the White House revealed that the intelligence 
gathering had identified four differing streams of data – one from a United Nations 
advisor, one from the National Security Agency within the Department of Defense, one 
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within the NCTC within the Department of Justice and a fourth from the United States 
Embassy in Nigeria
87
. The fourth stream was the more commonly known attempt by 
Abdulmattalab‘s father to inform the embassy that his son was missing and ―was likely 
under the influence of religious extremists based in Yemen.‖88 
What appeared to work, at least in the initial analysis, was the sharing of 
information among the collectors. As was mentioned previously, there were a number of 
different threads of information related to Abdulmatallab from different sources. But 
what appeared to fail in this context was knowledge transfer from information collectors 
to actors; in this case, DHS organizations as United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, which might have checked Abdulmattalab‘s name against a terrorist 
database and recommended to the State Department that Abdulmatallab‘s visa be denied, 
or US Customs and Border Protection, which through its Immigration Advisory Program, 
can make a recommendation to foreign authorities whether or not an individual should be 
allowed to board an aircraft bound for the United States. In this case, because 
Abdulmatallab‘s name did not appear on either the Terrorist Screening Database or the 
more restrictive No-Fly List, no recommendation was made to Dutch officials
89
. There 
appeared to be more of a focus on the potential of an attack on US interests in Yemen 
than on a direct attack on the United States
90
. Part of the lack of focus on securing the 
homeland still appears to be a cultural divide and an operational gap between the 
collectors of intelligence, who are primarily oriented in the international sphere, and the 
DHS operators, obviously focused on the domestic sphere
91
 
92
.  
This captures only part of the problem. Because DHS lacks an inherent 
intelligence collection capability or an authoritative operational command to take in and 
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disseminate information, but instead relies on others who rarely orient their thinking 
towards a domestic threat, it remains stifled in its ability to rapidly deploy 
countermeasures that would have potentially interdicted a terrorist actor such as 
Abdulmatallab before he ever boarded a plane.  
Another case of the failure to adequately share information occurred in the case of 
Nidal Hassan, a U.S. Army major serving as a psychiatrist. Hassan, of Palestinian 
descent, killed and wounded 42 persons on the campus of Ft. Hood, Texas. Although 
there are lingering debates about whether Hassan‘s attack was a manifestation or radical 
Islamic extremism or a case of radical workplace violence, there is no doubt that Hassan 
communicated with and proselytized about radical Islamic thinking. Hassan delivered a 
guest lecture in 2007 entitled, ―Is the War on Terrorism a War on Islam? an Islamic 
Perspective,‖ where he appeared to be justifying terrorism93. The military, in conducting 
an internal investigation, determined that Hassan was not a threat.
94
   
  This is indicative of a small but disturbing trend; an increase in threat 
diversification from overseas-based attacks to domestically-initiated attacks, plots and 
recruitment by terrorist organizations
95
.
 
In each of those cases, it does not appear that 
intelligence or information sharing conducted or disseminated by DHS contributed in any 
significant way to intercepting or even identifying these incidents, despite their domestic 
orientation.  
What the Department of Homeland Security has, in fact, done is to substitute an 
entire information sharing network (fusion centers) because it lacks intelligence-
gathering authority, despite having an inability to quantify the impact of the fusion 
centers or even be able to determine how much they cost.
96
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Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 
Critical Infrastructure is defined as ―systems and assets, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and 
assets would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.
97‖. As an executive 
mandate, the White House released Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, which 
directed the Secretary of DHS to coordinate the national effort to protect Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR) from terrorist attacks
98
.  
The QHSR lumps three disparate elements into the mission goal concerning 
critical infrastructure, all under the mantra of protection: critical infrastructure/key 
resources, leadership and events.
99
 For the purpose of this analysis, only the protection of 
critical infrastructure and key resources will be considered. The United States Secret 
Service, inserted whole into the DHS, has long owned the mission of protecting the 
President, Vice-President and other key officials and has long held the requisite 
authorities to do so. 
Over 85 percent of the buildings, plants, pipelines, wiring and land classified as 
critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector. This includes over 5,800 hospitals, 
120,000 miles of railroads, and 2,800 power generating stations across 18 different 
sectors.
100
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As mentioned in the previous section, the Department established a Directorate 
for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection pursuant to the direction provided 
within the Homeland Security Act. The Act establishes broad responsibilities for the 
department in the protection of critical infrastructure, including direction 
―To develop a comprehensive national plan for securing 
the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United 
States, including power production, generation, and distribution 
systems, information technology and telecommunications systems 
(including satellites), electronic financial and property 
record storage and transmission systems, emergency preparedness 
communications systems, and the physical and technological 
assets that support such systems.‖101 
 
Table/Chart 3 :National Infrastructure Protection Plan Sectors and 
Sector Leads 
 Critical infrastructure 
and key resource 
sector  
Departments of Agriculturea and Food and Drug Administration  Agriculture and Food  
Department of Defensec  Defense Industrial 
Base  
Department of Energy  Energy 
Department of Health and Human Services  Healthcare and Public 
Health  
Department of the Interior  National Monuments 
and Icons  
Department of the Treasury  Banking and Finance  
Environmental Protection Agency  Water 
Department of Homeland Security  
 
 Office of Infrastructure Protection  
 
Commercial Facilities  
Critical Manufacturing 
Emergency Services 
Nuclear Reactors,  
Materials, and Waste  
Dams  
Chemical Sectors  
 Information 
Technology 
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Despite the breadth of responsibility, the language provided within the Act 
explicitly directs a new DHS to furnish the ―voluntary‖ submission of critical 
infrastructure information and develop the appropriate standards and protocols for 
protecting said information. It also indicates that the President may designate authority to 
a federal critical infrastructure protection program to enter into ―voluntary agreement(s) 
to promote critical infrastructure security.‖102  
Under that auspices, the Department developed the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan in 2006, which established a series of seventeen CI/KR sectors (an 
eighteenth was later added) to develop an overarching framework for protecting critical 
infrastructure.  
Through the councils and resources provided by the department, a series of 
 Seventeen sector-specific plans developed through consortia of lead federal agencies and  
a series of private-public coordinating councils to manage efforts in each sector. The only 
exceptions are the National Monuments and Icons and the Government Facilities sectors, 
where the stakeholders are only public agencies.  
The results have been mixed. In 2007, an initial assessment of the sector-specific 
plans determined that while most of the plans that were reviewed contained some 
recommended elements, such as security goals, methodologies for prioritizing 
 Office of Cyber Security and Communications  
 
Communications 
Sectors  
 
 Transportation Security Administration  
 
Postal and Shipping  
 
 Transportation Security Administration and U. S. Coast Guard 
 
Transportation 
Systems  
 
 Federal Protective Service 
 
Government Facilities 
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infrastructure and developing programs to assess threats, risks, and vulnerabilities, many 
did not contain a key element identified for private-public cooperation, namely, 
incentives for private companies to implement protective security measures
103
.  In 
response, DHS developed an Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) Security 
Survey in 2009, which provides an online, voluntary survey to assess vulnerabilities and 
protective measures taken by (CI/KR) owner-operators. An eighteenth sector, Critical 
Manufacturing, was also added. The Office of Infrastructure Protection, now an office 
under a DHS component called the National Protection and Programs Directorate, tracks 
the percent of CI/KR owner operators that implement recommended countermeasures. 
This recent approach received some praise for its increased use of a common risk 
assessment approach.
104
  
 In a June 2010 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary for NPPD, the Acting 
Director of Protective Security Coordination Division indicated that 234 (49 percent) of 
437 sites where the ECIP security survey had been conducted implemented protective 
measures during the 180-day period following the conduct of the ECIP survey. The 
Acting Director reported that the 234 sites made a total of 497 improvements across the 
various categories covered by the ECIP security survey, including information sharing, 
security management, security force, physical security, and dependencies while 239 sites 
reported no improvements during the period
105
.  Another GAO study found that while the 
department could better disseminate information about critical infrastructure protective 
measures to its private-sector partners, the voluntary nature of the relationship inherently 
makes the department cautious about purporting that countermeasures in its 
recommendations are interpreted as standards.
106
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The Department has attempted to utilize regulatory authority within one specific 
sector: chemical facilities. In 2007, an interim final rule was published effectively 
codifying the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
107
, which established 
protective standards for a range of facilities that housed a list of 322 chemicals that were 
either referenced in other regulations, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention
108
, or 
are considered critical to either a government mission or the national economy.   
However, it has taken DHS several years to fund, staff and develop a program to meet 
their obligations within the regulations; as a result, not a single facility has completed the 
CFATS process as of February 2011.
109
   
 
Cybersecurity 
 
The threat of physical terrorism has been with the United States for some time, but the 
emerging threat of terrorist or other malicious acts perpetrated through cyberspace also 
poses a daunting, emerging threat. An inability to prepare for and properly defend against 
cyber attacks is viewed as one of the ―most serious economic and national security 
challenges we face as a nation‖110. While cybersecurity is clearly a more nascent mission 
area than others within the DHS mission set, the initial actions underscore a lack of 
sufficient and comprehensive enough authority to properly secure cyberspace. 
As part of its QHSR, DHS identified Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace as 
one of its five core missions
111
. In addition, two of the sectors identified within the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan are the Information Technology and 
Communications sectors. However, the emergence of cyber threats and actual incidents, 
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as well as our increasing reliance on cyberspace for a vast array of functions, led DHS to 
identify cybersecurity as a unique mission.  
Overarching direction for network security of federal agencies was established in 
2002 with the passage of the Federal Information Management Security Act (FISMA), 
passed as part of the E-Government Act of 2002. Standards for the FISMA are currently 
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Cybersecurity 
policy was first established in 2003 with the White House‘s National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace. Similar to the three tenets of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
the strategy identified foci of ―Prevent(ing) cyber attacks against America‘s critical 
infrastructures;   ―Reduce(ing) national vulnerability to cyber attacks; and ―Minimize(ing) 
damage and recovery time from cyber attacks that do occur.‖112 The National Strategy 
was later augmented by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23, which called for a 
National Cyber Security Initiative
113
 (Executive Office of the President, 2008). While no 
unclassified version of the directive was originally released under the Bush 
administration, elements of the initiative were opened up under the Obama administration 
in 2010 (Executive Office of the President, 2010)
114
. Elements of the NCSI conducted by 
the National Security Agency remain classified.    
 Cybersecurity is problematic in two distinct senses. First, like the broader 
spectrum of critical infrastructure (information technology being but one sector), the vast 
majority of the hardware, software and support infrastructure that enables the cyber 
sphere is owned and operated by the private sector. Second, cybersecurity profoundly 
blurs the typical distinctions between the military‘s role and the civilian government‘s 
role. The military, through its Cyber Command and the NSA, is equipped with significant 
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technological resources and funding to both propagate cyber attacks as a military strategy 
and defend against them, while Homeland Security‘s role is strictly defensive in nature. 
Both agencies have reached out to the private sector to provide assistance in helping to 
secure private sector networks. Although Homeland Security has only recently identified 
cyber as a distinct mission; its front-line cyber capabilities are largely embedded as a sub-
element of its National Protection and Programs Directorate, which also holds 
responsibility for the protection of all critical infrastructure, the security of federal 
executive branch buildings, the screening of visitors to the United States, and the 
National Communications System for first responders
115
. It has proposed ceding the 
function of screening visitors to a different component starting with the passage of a 
budget for FY2013
116
. 
The DOD and the DHS did sign a Memorandum of Agreement in the fall of 2010 
that established parallel liaisons at each of the agencies‘ respective cyber operations 
centers.
117
. However, these are not agencies that stand on the same footing when it comes 
to resources: NSA‘s and the Cyber Command of DOD hold a combined budget of  $3.5 
billion, while the entire DHS budget related to cybersecurity, including protective 
capability, law enforcement capability, research and development and intelligence and 
analysis, is less than $1 billion.
118
 
119
.  
In addition, unlike the prevention of terrorism against a physical asset such as a 
building or a ship, where the probability of an actual event is relatively unlikely, attacks 
in cyberspace are occurring frequently and with increasing consequences.  An estimate 
by the Center for a New American Security indicates that the federal government‘s 
networks are attacked 1.8 billion times per month
120
. In the private sector, two significant 
34 
 
attacks occurred in 2011 that compromised extremely sensitive data belonging to two 
organizations. The data was housed at   RSA Security, which creates digital 
authentication devices for the federal government and Fortune 500 companies, and the 
Comodo Group, which creates digital certificates that confirm that a website is 
legitimate
121
 
122
. Within the federal government, a multi-pronged attack infiltrated 
numerous federal agencies in 2009, including DHS, the Department of Defense, the 
Federal Aviation Administration and others, causing several of their websites to be shut 
down
123
.      
 Despite all of the various documents attempting to craft a cyber strategy, there is 
little or any distinct authority that emerges. The FISMA establishes standards for federal 
network security, which have been developed and refined by the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology within the Department of Commerce. Currently, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the President‘s arm for managing items such as real property 
and improper payments, is the organization responsible for overseeing FISMA.
124 
 
However, there is no defined standard for cybersecurity outside of federal networks that 
the DHS, NSA or any other agency can even provide voluntary measures against, never 
mind regulations
125
.  
Additionally, the CNCI offers specific efforts as part of the initiative, but does not 
specifically identify DHS as having enforcement authority either within federal networks, 
state and local networks, or in the private sector.  HSPD-23 established the creation of a 
National Cyber Security Center at DHS to coordinate and integrate information to secure 
information technology networks
126
. However, the function that the National Cyber 
Security Center (NCSC) was tasked with executing was largely already being conducted 
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within NPPD at DHS (The two were merged under the Obama administration) This fact, 
plus additional uncertainties and confusion about roles and responsibilities between the 
White House and executive agencies, led the first Director of the NCSC to resign 
abruptly.
127
   
 The lack of clear lines of authority and coordination within cybersecurity are well 
acknowledged. President Obama‘s cyberspace policy identified that ―the federal 
government is not organized to address this growing problem effectively now or in the 
future.
128
 It further states that existing authorities at the same time overlap and lack 
sufficient decision authority to enact a consistent approach to cybersecurity issues. 
President Obama, following one of the policy review‘s recommendations, did assign a 
cybersecurity ―czar,‖ or cyber coordinator for the federal government, but this again does 
little if anything to clarify the roles of specific organizations within the federal 
government. CSIS called the appointment of czars in general ―a symptom of our 
industrial-age government organization.
129
   
 Pending legislation identifies a number of different initiatives to address these 
problems. The act would require companies to report when the private data of their 
customers has been compromised, which is viewed as a negative incentive for companies 
to increase their protective measures
130
.  It would also establish DHS as a regulatory 
authority over critical infrastructure related to cybersecurity, although the exact nature 
and strength of that regulatory role is much in flux
131
 
132
.    
 In the absence of authority to enforce standards on critical infrastructure, DHS has 
allocated much of its resource in cybersecurity towards protection of the .gov 
environment, when in fact the vast majority of attacks (and the vast majority of the 
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economic activity) occurs in the private sector. Over 80 percent of the department‘s 
budget in its Fiscal Year 2013 submission to Congress addresses protection of the .gov 
domain. A pair of studies conducted by the protection firm McAfee and security 
consultant SAIC concluded that cyber attacks have advanced beyond simple identity theft 
of individuals and moved to the theft of corporate intellectual property, which has the 
potential for even greater economic impact than the $1 trillion in annual economic cost 
the first study reported.
133
  
 
National Preparedness Grants 
 
Since its inception, DHS has allocated nearly $35 billion dollars in grants to states 
and municipalities
134
 although homeland security funding for states and localities has 
been allocated by Congress since 1996 through the passage of The Defense Against 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act)
135. Created by 
the USA Patriot Act of 2001, the Homeland Security Grant Program was originally a 
series of seven grants, now consolidated to four – the State Homeland Security Program, 
the Urban Area Security Initiative, the Citizen Corps Program, and the Metropolitan 
Medical Response System. Under these four funding streams, multiple grant sub-
programs include fire protection, emergency communications, public transit security and 
driver‘s license upgrades136.  The Homeland Security Grant program was designed to 
provide needed capabilities to states and localities to be prepared for terrorist attacks. In 
addition, numerous other grant programs target more specific areas, but fall under the 
broader category of national preparedness, as seen in the table below. 
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
Table/Chart 4. Homeland Security Preparedness 
Grant Programs   
Homeland Security Grant Program  
State Homeland Security Program  
Urban Areas Security Initiative  
Citizen Corps Program  
Metropolitan Medical Response System  
Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program  
Buffer Zone Protection Program  
Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance Program  
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program  
Emergency Operations Center Grant Program  
Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program  
Port Security Grant Program  
Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program  
Transit Security Grant Program  
 
The scope of the programs listed here does not include grants that are aligned to 
other DHS mission areas, such as Operation Stonegarden, which provides funding for 
state and local law enforcement for states on the U.S. border with Mexico and grants for 
marine safety administered by the US Coast Guard. 
The original formula for allocating Homeland Security grants came in two parts. 
According to the Act, each state was to receive a guaranteed minimum award equal to 
three-quarters of 1% (the ―three-quarters rule‖) of the total funding, plus a discretionary 
amount of the total terrorism preparedness funds
137
 (Congress of the United States, 2001). 
The rest of the funds were allocated on a ―risk-based‖ formula that only took into account 
population as a meaningful variable. As a result, states such as Wyoming received $38 
per person while the state of California, with a denser population, a land border, a 
maritime border and more critical infrastructure, received only $5 per capita.
138
 
(Matthews, Schneider, 2010).  
Immediately, charges of political influence were raised, critics citing that rural, 
low population states obtained a much greater share of funding per capita than they 
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deserved (Randsell, 2004). In response, the Department developed a smaller program, the 
Urban Area Security Initiative, which allocated funds based upon a risk-based formula 
that includes threat, vulnerability and consequence.
139
 However, funding for other grant 
programs such as the State Homeland Security Grant Program maintained population 
density as part of its overall framework, although it incorporated elements such as critical 
infrastructure
140
.   
Over $5 billion has been provided to cities since UASI began. A study shows that a 
positive correlation existed between risk factors and the allocation of monies via UASI
141
  
 
 
 
Table/Chart 5. FY2002-FY2009 Appropriations for Homeland Security 
Assistance 
Programs 
Amounts in millions 
Program  
 
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 
SHSGP 316 1,870 1,700 1,100 550 525 950 950 950 
UASI 3 800 725 885 765 770 820 838 887 
LETPP   500 400 400 375    
CIPP  200        
PSP 198 170 125 150 175 210 400 550 300 
TSP    150 150 175 400 550 300 
BSP   10 10 10 12 12 12 12 
TRSP   22 5 5 12 16 8  
EOC       15 35 60 
BZPP     50 50 50 50 50 
FIRE 390 750 750 715 655 662 750 985 810 
EMPG 168 170 180 180 185 200 300 315 340 
CCP 25 30 40 15 20 15 15 15 13 
MMRS 25 30 40 15 20 15 15 15 13 
TTAE&E 333 330 292 341 296 298 299 429 266 
CEDAP     50 50 25 8  
PSIC       50 50 50 
REAI ID       50 50 50 
RCPG       35 35 35 
TOTALS 1,428 4,370 4,394 3,981 3,341 3,387 4,228 4,921 4,1
64 
 
Source: Congressional Research Service 
However, even though grant monies are allocated based on risk, there is little 
ability for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to control how the 
money is spent. While FEMA provides grant guidance each year, it does not specify 
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items or even provide standards for items that are purchased by state and local partners – 
indeed, it does not have the legislative authority to do so. For example, FEMA‘s grant 
guidance for fiscal year 2011 indicated that ―Maturation and Enhancement of State and 
Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,‖ is one of the department‘s highest priorities. While 
states were ―strongly recommended‖ to utilize their funding for this purpose.142, there is 
no way to ensure that funding was used for fusion centers or FEMA‘s other priorities. 
Even though DHS‘s authority is limited, the overall regulatory picture proves 
more complicated in the area of grants than in the other areas examined thus far. The 
original Patriot Act legislation, while providing baseline funding for every state, contains 
no provisions or mandates for states to report on its expenditures to DHS or provide 
quantifiable updates on progress. However, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006 mandated that every state provide an annual 
preparedness report to Congress
143
.  In 2007, as part of its response to the Act, FEMA 
released a set of National Preparedness Guidelines that included a process for 
establishing current levels of capability and measuring progress towards targeted 
capability. Part of the guidelines involved measuring a set of target capabilities 
established by FEMA that were standardized across jurisdictions
144
 
145
. These guidelines 
were developed in order to assist states and localities with three primary objectives:  
 to help (states and localities) address deficiencies 
 to identify alternative sources of capabilities (e.g., from mutual aid or 
contracts with the private sector); and  
 to identify which capabilities should be tested through exercises. 
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     Using the targeted capabilities list as its starting point, FEMA attempted to 
specifically quantify national preparedness through what it called its ―Cost to 
Capabilities‖ Initiative, which it designed to help prioritize grant funding based on what 
capabilities were lacking on a jurisdictional basis. However, FEMA never was able to 
develop specific, quantifiable metrics that could assess national capabilities; it chose to 
scrap the cost to capabilities program in 2009
146
. Subsequently, FEMA planned on 
conducting a nationwide, multi-year gap analysis program, starting in 2009, ―to provide 
emergency management agencies at all levels of government with greater situational 
awareness of response resources and capabilities,‖(FEMA, 2009). However, FEMA 
discontinued this effort in late 2010 due to states‘ inability to provide information about 
their own capabilities
147
.  
Arguably, if FEMA has stronger authorities to withhold grant funds, jurisdictions 
would be more inclined to effectively report progress. On the other hand, FEMA has not 
produced a well thought-out plan to systematically collect, measure and manage against a 
set of targeted capabilities; it has rightly been criticized by numerous sources for its 
inability to measure  achievements made via grant funding
148
 
149
. With the introduction of 
Presidential Planning Directive 8 in March of 2011, the current set of targeted capabilities 
has been scrapped and will be replaced in 2012150. The implication is that for the time 
being, there is no definitive path towards understanding national preparedness; the 
current plan, released in August of 2011, plans for a National Preparedness Report to be 
produced by March 2012
151
. At this time there is no definitive methodology established 
for how ―national preparedness‖ will be quantified.  
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VI. The Homeland Security Enterprise: Still Disjointed 
An examination of particular authorities in the Department of Homeland Security 
reveals some potential hurdles to maturation. However, when considering the 
Department‘s challenges from a legislative standpoint, it is impossible not to consider 
organizational barriers as well, both internal to DHS and outside of DHS. The main 
reason internal organizational challenges must be considered is that, among its many 
other directions to DHS, the PKEMRA rescinded the Department‘s authority to internally 
reorganize, due to what it saw as negatively impactful prior shuffling
152
.    
Organizational Constructs 
When Congress established DHS in 2003, it never intended to consolidate all 
homeland security activities under one organizational banner. Indeed, the merger of 22 
agencies, despite being the largest government re-organization since the Department of 
Defense in 1947, left enormous swaths of personnel, money and functions categorized as 
homeland security in other organizations.   
In examining the history of the department‘s formation, it was shown that 
significant political motivations influenced which organizations were incorporated and 
which were left out of the new DHS. By consequence, this left a significant number of 
organizations with homeland security functions outside of the DHS. As a method for 
examining which agencies may be useful candidates to move into or out of DHS to help 
facilitate the department‘s maturation, it is useful to examine where the money for 
homeland security is spent in the federal government currently. 
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 As an analytical tool for determining what organizations may be candidates for 
transfer, the Office of Management and Budget‘s (OMB) annual tabulation of resources 
dedicated to homeland security functions, published in the President‘s Budget to 
Congress, proves a useful tool. For the budget year 2008, a total of $61.2 billion dollars 
was appropriated for homeland security activities across 32 federal agencies as diverse as 
the Department of Commerce and the Social Security Administration
153
. This increased 
in FY 2009 to 70.5 billion. and slightly decreased in FY 2010 to 70.2 billion.   
In FY 2008, 29.7 billion, or 49 percent, was comprised of the Department of 
Homeland Security expenditures in FY 2008. In FY 2009 36 billion, or 51 percent, of the 
total homeland security funding was expended within the department. Finally, in FY 
2010, 32.8 million, or 47 percent, of the total homeland security expenditures were spent 
within DHS. Because a budget was never passed for FY 2011, the funding allocations for 
these years remain at FY 2010 levels with minor modifications. 
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Table/Chart 6 - DHS spending versus total Homeland Security Spending (in 
billions of dollars) 
           
 
Admittedly, analyzing homeland security expenditures is somewhat crude if it 
only ascribes to the top-line budget, so a more detailed examination is necessary. OMB‘s 
annual document reveals that of the $70 billion is allocated for homeland security 
activities, 52.4 percent ($36.8 billion) is contained within 29 other Cabinet-level agencies 
and smaller organizations. By comparison, in 2003, the first year DHS operated as a 
Cabinet-level agency, OMB estimated that 54 percent, or 23 billion, of the total homeland 
security funding was contained within DHS
154
. In the intervening years, there is some 
slight vacillation due to supplemental funding requests for response to events, but these 
data reveal that generally between 50 and 55 percent of all homeland security funding is 
contained within DHS. 
Homeland Security Funding, FY 2008
$29,755.80 , 
49%
$31,472.00 , 
51%
DHS
Non-DHS
Homeland Security Funding, FY 2009
$36,036.50 
, 51%
$34,408.80 
, 49%
DHS
Non-DHS
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The Analytical Perspectives documentation provided by the Office of 
Management and Budget presents some limitations in its data. For one, OMB does not 
consider funds expended for natural disasters as part of the scope of homeland security, 
despite the historical roots of homeland security residing in civil defense
155
. In addition, 
the current set of DHS missions incorporates a mission that provides resilience to 
disasters for all hazards, regardless of whether they originate via natural, man-made or 
hostile means
156
.  
In order to develop a list where there might be efficiency and effectiveness gained 
by the transfer of functions, the principles of scale and political feasibility where applied. 
Utilizing scale, a cutoff line of a minimum of $50 million in funds must have been 
allocated as homeland security funding. Political feasibility is examined on a case-by-
case basis within the context of the recommendations made later in this paper.   
In addition, a few operating assumptions were made. First, OMB categorizes 
funds that are used to pay for security at federal buildings as part of the protecting critical 
infrastructure and key assets, pursuant to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
157
. 
The NIPP lists federal buildings as one of the 18 key sectors. Because agencies would 
likely spend this money regardless of whether OMB and the NIPP categorized it as 
critical or not, these funds were excluded from the set taken under consideration, with the 
exception of the Defense Department, which retains its own security for military bases 
separate from other federal buildings at a cost of $12.3 billion.  Also, every federal 
agency utilizes funding to pay for its Continuity of Operations (COOP) programs and 
activities. Although FEMA is the lead government agency for Continuity of Operations 
among executive agencies, each agency must bear some expense for determining its own 
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unique plan to address how it maintains critical operations in the event of an emergency. 
Therefore, these funds are excluded from the analysis as well.   
This renders a set of 42 programs that warrant inspection, listed below in 
descending order by their FY 2012 appropriation:  
  
Table/Chart 7: Non-DHS federal funds requested for 
homeland security (FY 2012) 
Agency Appropriation Alignment 
Amount 
(in 
Millions) 
Health and Human 
Services  
Dep. Mgmt./ Public Health 
and Social Services 
Emergency Fund 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $2,729.10 
Justice 
FBI/ Salaries and 
Expenses 
Domestic 
Counterterrorism $2,282.00 
Health and Human 
Services  NIH 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $1,794.00 
State 
Admin. of Foreign 
Affairs/Diplomatic and 
Consular Programs 
Border and 
Transportation Security $1,709.70 
Energy 
Natl. Nuclear Security 
Administration/Weapons 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $1,126.50 
Defense RDT&E/Defense 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $817.70 
Defense 
Operation and 
Maintenance/ Navy 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $728.70 
Defense 
Operation and 
Maintenance/ Army 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $611.10 
Justice 
ATF/Salaries and 
Expenses 
Domestic 
Counterterrorism $450.50 
NSF 
Research and Related 
Activities 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $355.30 
Justice 
FBI/ Salaries and 
Expenses 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $309.30 
Energy 
Env. and other Defense 
Activities/Defense 
Environmental Cleanup 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $276.50 
Justice 
General 
Administration/Tactical 
Law Enforcement Wireless 
Communications 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $230.00 
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Agriculture 
Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service 
Border and 
Transportation Security $228.20 
Health and Human 
Services  
FDA/ Salaries and 
Expenses 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $217.50 
Justice 
FBI/ Salaries and 
Expenses Intelligence and Warning $198.20 
SSA 
Social Security 
Administration/Limitation 
on Administrative 
Expenses 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $189.10 
Veterans' Affairs 
Departmental 
Administration, IT Systems 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $184.50 
Agriculture 
Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $183.10 
NASA Cross-Agency Support 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $180.10 
Energy 
Env. and other Defense 
Activities/Other Defense 
Activities 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $158.20 
Energy 
Natl. Nuclear Security 
Administration/Weapons 
Emergency 
Preparedness and 
Response $155.20 
Defense 
Operation and 
Maintenance/ Air Force 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $152.80 
GSA 
Real Property 
Activities/Federal 
Buildings Fund 
Border and 
Transportation Security $151.00 
Agriculture US Forest Service 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $135.00 
Transportation FAA/Operations 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $133.20 
Energy 
Natl. Nuclear Security 
Administration/Defense 
Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $103.10 
Veterans' Affairs 
Veterans' Health 
Admin./Medical Support 
and Compliance 
Emergency 
Preparedness and 
Response $102.30 
Justice 
Legal Activities and US 
Marshalls/Salaries and 
Expenses, US Marshalls 
Service 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $92.60 
Defense Procurement/Other, Navy 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $89.70 
Justice 
National Security 
Division/Salaries and 
Expenses Intelligence and Warning $87.90 
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Defense 
Operation and 
Maintenance/ Army 
Emergency 
Preparedness and 
Response $86.90 
Commerce 
Bureau of Industry and 
Security/operations and 
Admin. 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $85.80 
Energy Energy Programs/Science 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $83.00 
Defense 
Operation and 
Maintenance/ Air Force 
Emergency 
Preparedness and 
Response $80.20 
Health and Human 
Services  NIH 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $74.20 
Health and Human 
Services  
FDA/ Salaries and 
Expenses 
Emergency 
Preparedness and 
Response $72.00 
Justice 
DEA/Salaries and 
Expenses 
Domestic 
Counterterrorism $64.20 
State 
Admin. of Foreign 
Affairs/Diplomatic and 
Consular Programs Intelligence and Warning $56.50 
Health and Human 
Services  CDC 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $55.70 
EPA 
Hazardous Substance 
Superfund 
Emergency 
Preparedness and 
Response $54.80 
Defense 
Procurement/Defense-
Wide 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats $53.80 
Justice 
Legal Activities and US 
Marshalls/Salaries and 
Expenses, US Attorneys 
Domestic 
Counterterrorism $52.00 
EPA Science and Technology 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets $50.20 
 
In examining each funding stream in depth, we will look to each organization‘s 
Congressional Justification to Congress for details about the explicit activities it 
conducts, as well as other supportive documents as needed 
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Health and Human Services (Public Health and Social Services Emergency 
Fund, National Institutes of Health, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, $4.94 billion) – The Public Health and Social Services 
Emergency Fund contains a myriad of programs in its role as the lead agency for 
Emergency Support Function #8, which involves the public health response for disasters 
developed under the National Response Framework
158
. These include the National 
Disaster Medical System, which provides emergency medical services to states and 
localities whose resources are overwhelmed, as well as preparedness activities associated 
with deploying those assets. Another major program is Project Bioshield, a program that 
deploys medical countermeasures in the form of vaccines and medicines should there be 
a biological, chemical or radioloigical attack. In addition, the funding includes grants for 
hospital preparedness, which provide funding for hospital around the country to develop 
evacuation protocols and other emergency procedures.
159
  
        Authorities are somewhat convoluted within the context of health emergency 
response. While the PKEMRA established a Chief Medical Officer (CMO) within DHS, 
the legislation explicitly stated that the CMO was responsible for coordinating response 
and recovery for medical issues natural disasters, acts of terrorism and other man-made 
disasters within DHS, but overall coordination for federal efforts related issues rests with 
the Secretary of HHS, pursuant to the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
160
. 
        HHS is certainly in the best position to acquire, test and deploy vaccines and other 
medications through Project Bioshield and the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, as well as deploy medical professionals through the NDMS. However, when 
it comes to hospital preparedness, many of the emergency preparedness functions 
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articulated as objectives within this program are very similar to actions taken by state and 
local governments that receive Homeland Security Grants. 
In addition, there is a notable omission in what OMB includes within the 
Emergency Preparedness and Response arena. HHS requests $643 million in its 2012 
budget for a Public Health and Emergency Preparedness grant program it administers to 
states and localities
161
. DHS administers $3.8 billion in grants designed for a variety of 
purposes centered around emergency preparedness and security and requests about the 
same amount in 2012
162
. 
In terms of the National Institutes of Health, the Homeland Security Act 
specifically laid out a research and development program that authorized HHS as the 
primary agency to research and develop countermeasures for civilian human health 
(biological, biomedical and infectious disease). 
DHS performs research and development in a host of other areas via its Science 
and Technology Directorate, but is forbidden from conducting research in human 
health
163
. The Food and Drug Administration‘s homeland security funding is principally 
geared towards the testing and approval process for these medical countermeasures
164
. 
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention is the agency responsible for maintaining 
and deploying if necessary, medical countermeasures in the case of a medical 
emergency
165
.  
Besides the activities listed previously, DHS‘s resources allocated to health issues 
are relatively small. The DHS Office of Health Affairs‘ (OHA) budget request for 2012 
claims that it serves as the principal medical advisor to DHS leadership, leads DHS 
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biodefense, chemical defense, and food, veterinary and agricultural defense, provides 
health guidance and policy, coordinates health security activities and improves the health 
and safety of the DHS workforce. Yet the budget reveals that over $122 million of a $160 
million budget are requested for biodefense programs, while only $2 million is requested 
for chemical defense and $6 million for planning and coordination
166
. No specific money 
is requested for food, veterinary and agriculture programs. 
The dominant program within DHS‘s health expenditures is BioWatch, a grid of 
sensors designed to detect biological threats of high concern. The current concept of 
operations involves collecting samples from sensors once a day and sending them to a 
laboratory for analysis; if the analysis verifies a known pathogen, then local public health 
officials are informed to develop and coordinate a response
167
.  The next version of 
Biowatch, known as Generation-3, will incorporate analysis of the sample directly within 
the detection unit, reducing the time it takes to make a positive detection of a pathogen
168
.    
The biosurveillance system is a complex mix of federal agencies, capabilities, and 
responsibilities, of which Biowatch only plays a part. Strong concerns about the costs and 
benefits of automated detection have been raised by numerous entities, as well as the 
need for DHS to better coordinate with state and local public health officials, who will 
play the leading role in developing the response to the release of a toxic agent 
169
 
170
. 
Both entities also articulated the need for a national strategy for biosurveillance and a 
declared coordinating entity for all biosurveillance efforts
171
 
172
.     
 
Dept. Of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), General Administration, Drug Enforcement 
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Administration (DEA), U.S. Marshalls’ Service, National Security Division, $3.76 
billion) – The FBI, as the principal law enforcement investigative agency in the United 
States, assumes a primary role in gathering intelligence about terrorists and their potential 
activity within the United States. It also administers a series of Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces in 104 cities nationwide that provide security for special events, respond to 
incidents and gather intelligence
173
. The FBI also operates the Terrorism Screening 
Center, the principal repository for screening individuals for terrorism activity and 
providing that information to appropriate federal and state law enforcement. DHS is often 
the recipient of this information, and utilizes it for programs such as Secure Flight that 
cross-reference airline passengers against the terrorism watchlist. 
The FBI maintains a Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate that investigates   
the potential hostile use of biological, chemical, and radiological/nuclear weapons, while 
DHS provides the defensive posture against these weapons with programs such as 
Biowatch, which monitors cities nationwide for biological exposures, and Advanced 
Spectroscopic Portals (ASP), which screen cargo for nuclear and radiological material at 
entry points to the United States
174
.   
The ATF‘s principal capabilities related to homeland security reside in the 
forensic analysis unit it shares with the FBI to investigate bombings, including the 
analysis of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) from Afghanistan and Iraq (Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2011). It also operates a National Center for 
Explosives Training and Research, which trains federal, state and local law enforcement 
and the US military
175
.  
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Law Enforcement Wireless Communications‘ budget request primarily seeks to 
consolidate and modernize the four major legacy wireless communications networks of 
the FBI, DEA, ATF and the US Marshall Service, and expand the program to other law 
enforcement partners, including DHS. The Departments of Justice, Treasury and 
Homeland Security signed a joint memorandum in 2004 to develop a joint wireless 
system, but modified that agreement in 2008 to ―deploy shared systems where their 
respective interests and mission priorities overlap.
176‖.  
Courthouse security is conducted by the US Marshall Service
177
 (ibid). The US 
Marshall Service also provides protective details for federal judges and prosecutors, a 
function similar to the role the United States Secret Service plays in protecting the 
President, Vice-President, and visiting heads of state
178
.   
  The entirety of the Department of Justice‘s National Security Division‘s Budget 
is categorized under homeland security funding. However, the vast majority of the 
National Security Division‘s programs are purely legal in nature, including its programs 
that ensure intelligence operations conform to the rule of law
179
 and those that represent 
federal agencies in court seeking to conduct surveillance or searches under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.
180
 
Finally, the Drug Enforcement Agency‘s primarily responsibility involves 
breaking traditional criminal enterprises that traffic drugs, but the agency has also 
investigated and successfully interdicted incidences of narco-terrorism. It has also 
conducted operations in Afghanistan to assist the military with the elimination of the 
poppy industry to prevent Afghanistan from assuming a role as a major heroin importer 
to the United States
181
.  
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In examining DHS‘s budget and programs, it provides little capability in 
examining explosives. In fact, it explicitly omitted explosives from its strategic goal 
dealing with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats in the 
QHSR
182
. However, the department does maintain a large Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center (FLETC) in many operational techniques of law enforcement.
183
 One 
limited program exists within the Department‘s National Protection and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD); an Office of Bombing Prevention, which primarily serves as a ―go-
between‖ among federal partners and state and local governments184.  
NPPD‘s Federal Protective Service operates a program of providing security at 
federal executive agency buildings, a function very similar to the role of the U.S. 
Marshall‘s Service at courthouses (ibid). NPPD also operates the Office of Emergency 
Communications, which is responsible for the National Communications System, which 
allows the government to prioritize its communications over differing communication 
channels (landline, classified landline, wireless, and radio) in the event of an emergency 
and also has developed the National Strategy for Interoperability between Federal, State 
and local national security and emergency management officials
185
.  
 Finally, this paper has already paid significant attention to the challenges faced 
between the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis‘s authorities and responsibilities 
and those of the FBI. To synopsize, the FBI has significant capabilities in intelligence 
gathering that the DHS I&A is not allowed to possess per the Homeland Security Act, yet 
it must rely on the FBI for this very type of data in order to identify patterns and 
communicate information to state and local officials.    
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Department of Energy (National Nuclear Security Administration, 
Environmental and Other Defense Activities, Energy Programs (Science), $1.9 billion  – 
The Department of Energy‘s homeland security activities represent a broad cross-section 
of activity, spanning a range of operational and research activities. Approximately $155 
million is budgeted in FY 2012 for emergency response coordination in the result a 
nuclear incident, including a Nuclear Emergency Support Team
186
 (Department of 
Energy, 2011).It also provides technical expertise in the form of a nuclear forensics lab 
and technical expertise related to stolen, modified or improvised nuclear devices possibly 
intended for hostile use (ibid).  While FEMA coordinates all federal agency response 
capabilities in the event of a disaster, it relies on specific expertise from a variety of 
different agencies, including DOE, within the National Response Framework‘s 
Emergency Support Functions
187
.  
Another major element of DOE‘s homeland security budget includes the 
protection of various nuclear facilities, including physical security, security systems, and 
screening processes ($722 million), which is categorized under the protection of critical 
infrastructure and key assets.  Although there are some specialized elements to the 
protection of facilities that contain nuclear material, many of the core screening processes 
are similar to work conducted by the Federal Protective Service at DHS, which provides 
the same screening capabilities to over 1,400 federal facilities
188
. Thirty-five million is 
also requested by DOE for the removal of radiological materials from various sites, while 
DOE requests $51 million for the protection of nuclear materials at civilian facilities via 
security enhancements
189
.  
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Finally, $125 million is allocated towards protecting critical infrastructure and 
key assets in the form of cyber security, specifically as it relates to facilities that house 
nuclear materials. As previously discussed in the cybersecurity section of this paper, DHS 
may potentially assume authority over cybersecurity as it relates to critical infrastructure 
and key resources
190
 
191
. Other aspects of the Department of Energy‘s budget allocated as 
homeland security funding include a very small portion, percentage-wise, of the cleanup 
of nuclear material from various National Laboratory sites ($276 million, or 4.4 percent), 
as well as a small amount of DOE‘s scientific research program related to nuclear 
isotopes
192
. 
By comparison, most DHS capabilities relating to radiological and nuclear threats 
reside within the department‘s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which 
largely came into being as part of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14193. The 
DNDO is largely staffed via scientists and engineers from other federal agencies, 
including Energy. The Bush administration chartered DNDO and ordered it to develop a 
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), which is the framework for how nuclear 
material shall be detected when it presents a threat to the United States, both before and 
after it reaches U.S borders
194
 (Executive Office of the President, 2005). DNDO led the 
effort to design a series of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASPs), which were meant to 
examine cargo at land and sea ports to detect nuclear material. However, the department 
recently cancelled the ASP program, citing repeated issues with operational speed and 
effectiveness that had occurred throughout the life of the program
195
 
196
. It is not certain 
at this point what the replacement will entail.  
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DNDO also provides a limited amount of grant funding to assist cities with 
developing specific detection architectures, known as Securing The Cities but so far has 
only initiated this effort for one location (New York City) since the program began
197
. 
The department also operates a Radiological Emergency Preparedness program via 
FEMA, which helps state and local governments to develop emergency preparedness 
plans if a nuclear power plant resides within their jurisdiction
198
.  
 
Department of State (Administration of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic and 
Consular Programs, $1.765 billion) – OMB‘s budget perspective allocates a total of 
$1.76 billion of State‘s $12.7 billion budget to homeland security, of which $1.7 billion is 
dedicated towards border and transportation security.
199
 The State department‘s primary 
function is to screen immigrant and non-immigrant visa requests and the supportive 
technology and processes that facilitate screening.
200
 Other funds are allocated towards 
information sharing conducted between consular posts and US law enforcement, 
including DHS. In reviewing these elements, there is little potential conflict in the 
functions that the State Department conducts versus the systems and processes that DHS 
supports.       
  
Department of Defense (Operations and Maintenance, Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation, $2.59 billion) – The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) detailed 
breakout of homeland security dollars is not easily discerned. Unlike other agencies, 
DOD does not provide detailed congressional justifications for each of its subprograms or 
activities. A small amount of funding is targeted towards anti-terrorism technologies
201
 . 
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This is discerned by separating the amount in the homeland security budget dedicated 
towards Research, Development Test and Evaluation identified in DOD‘s appropriation 
($817 million). Also included is funding to maintain a constant state of readiness and 
execute air patrols at 18 locations throughout the United States, which are executed 
predominantly through the  Northern Command, or NORTHCOM
202
.  
Although this study categorically excluded funding for federal agency-specific 
physical security, it should be noted that the $12 billion previously excluded for internal 
security represents another significant and separate physical security program, distinct 
from the ones already identified at DHS, DOJ and DOE.  
 
National Science Foundation (Research and Related Activities - $355.3 million) 
– While diversified across numerous directorates and homeland security categories, the 
largest amount of resources NSF dedicates to homeland security functions is in the area 
of cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience
203
. Most of this funding is dedicated 
towards applied research, with $40 million allocated towards implementing elements of 
the Comprehensive Cyber Security Initiative (CNCI), a cyber-focused strategic plan 
authored by the Bush administration
204. NSF‘s contributions to CNCI are composed of 
three elements: Moving Target Defense, which consists of developing flexible systems 
that can thwart potential cyber attacks; Tailored Trustworthy Spaces, which provide 
adaptable technologies for developing trusted internet connections that can help prevent 
damage propagated by cyber attacks; and Cyber Economic Initiatives, which strive to 
enhance network security through the development and adoption of market-based 
incentives. NSF‘s infrastructure resilience program primarily funds research with the 
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objective of mitigating damage done to buildings are other infrastructure by earthquakes 
and other natural disasters
205
. 
Through its Science and Technology Directorate, DHS funds a very similar 
program to the NSF Economic Initiatives program mentioned above. It also funds 
research for ―studying trustworthy computing in scaled environments.‖ It also identifies a 
―Moving Target Defense‖ initiative that will ―move and shift over time to increase and 
complexity and cost for attackers‖206.   
 
Department of Agriculture (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS); US Forest Service, $556 million) – Most of the personnel and screening 
technology to actually prevent hostile plants and animals from entering the Unites States 
was transferred to US Customs and Border Protection via the Homeland Security Act. 
The vast majority of the remaining APHIS budget is dedicated towards research and 
operations in order to eliminate hostile species
207
. 
The US Forest Service‘s contribution to homeland security involve specific law 
enforcement operations on forest service lands to counter violations against natural 
resources; The Forest Service, does, however, operate an investigative division that 
examines the growing and trafficking of illegal drugs on forest service lands
208
.  
 Although the Forest Service does conduct law enforcement operations, they are 
primarily geared towards natural resources, an area in which the Forest Service obviously 
holds more expertise. However, the investigative capacity of drug growing and 
trafficking appears to overlap Immigration and Customs Enforcement‘s Homeland 
Security Investigations (HIS) division, which holds wide authority for investigating 
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illegal immigration, drug trafficking, human trafficking, weapons smuggling and other 
illegal activity within the United States interior
209
.    
 
Social Security Administration (Limitation on Administrative Expenses, $189.1 
million) – However awkwardly named, the Limitation on Administrative Expenses 
appropriation administers the social security and supplemental security income 
programs
210
. An extremely small slice (1.4 percent) of the 12.9 billion allocated for 
administering social security assists DHS in administering E-Verify, a nationwide 
program that allows employer to determine, through social security and criminal checks, 
if a prospective employee is legally authorized to work in the United States. E-Verify 
utilizes a Social Security Administration developed and maintained database as one 
verification element
211
. As the generator of social security numbers for the nation, the 
SSA clearly owns this capability and provides an essential verification element for DHS‘s 
Citizenship and Immigration Services to provide a tool for US employer to hire legal 
labor.      
 
Veterans’ Affairs (Departmental Administration; Medical Support and 
Compliance, $286.8 million) – Veterans‘ Affairs resources are allocated towards 
information and system security within the departmental administration funding block; 
the VA has a $3 billion-plus information technology architecture that includes the vast 
VA medical system. Medical Support and Compliance funds provide preparedness 
capabilities for Veterans‘ Hospitals in order to help them respond effectively to an 
emergency. This program bears similarity to the Health and Human services‘ program 
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that assists civilian public and private hospitals prepare for emergencies
212
 
213
, which we 
have previously mentioned bear similarity to the FEMA programs that deal with all-
hazards preparedness for a variety of different entities and structures
214
 
NASA (Cross-Agency Support, $180.1 million) – Information in NASA‘s budget 
as it relates to homeland security is extremely limited; however, funding appears to be 
allocated towards implementation of information technology security and providing 
identification cards that use fingerprints for access to buildings and computer systems, 
commensurate with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12
215
. 
 
General Services Administration (Real Property Activity, Federal Buildings 
Fund, $151 million) – GSA owns and maintains a significant number of border 
checkpoints on both the Canadian and Mexican borders
216
 (General Services 
Administration, 2011). The Office of Management and Budget has proposed a transfer of 
these facilities and their budgets to US Customs and Border Protection starting in fiscal 
year 2013 
217
. 
 
Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration Operations, 
$133.2 million) – Federal Aviation Administration operations contribute to homeland 
security via the ability to screen and train airline pilots, as well as providing radar and 
computer technology to monitor and inform DHS operations about threats or incursions 
to United States airspace
218
 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011a). DHS is involved 
as partner with the FAA in developing the next generation of air traffic control 
technology, which will migrate from a radar-based platform to a satellite-based system
219
.  
61 
 
The FAA clearly operates these capabilities primarily for the purpose of managing US 
airspace for commercial and civil aviation, and provides the added benefit of providing 
domain awareness to DHS.    
 
Department of Commerce (Bureau of Industry and Security, $85.8 million) – 
The primary function of Commerce‘s Bureau of Industry and Security is to control 
exports of goods, processes and technologies that may pose a security hazard if obtained 
by United States adversaries. There would appear to be some potential opportunity for 
comingling with US Customs and Border Protection, which operates a Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) program. CSI operates in several foreign ports to inspect cargo bound for 
the United States
220
 
221
 . In addition, Commerce inspects outgoing cargo for violations of 
United States boycotts for political reasons. Although not classified as a homeland 
security mission, Customs and Border Protection‘s Office of Field Operations inspects 
inbound cargo for intellectual property violations above and beyond inspecting for 
threats
222
.  
 
Environmental Protection Agency (Science and Technology; Hazardous 
Materials Superfund, $105 million) - the EPA serves as the agency responsible for the 
protection of the nation‘s water supply and wastewater treatment facilities. These 
functions represent one of the critical infrastructure sectors under the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan
223
. It also provides capability to help states and localities 
prepare for, respond to and recover from chemical, biological and radiological or nuclear 
attacks, including large-scale efforts dedicated towards decontamination methods and 
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strategies if an attack occurs. While more general, FEMA‘s National Preparedness 
Directorate performs many of the same functions for state and local entities, whether the 
threat is from an accidental release or hostile use
224
. 
In addition, EPA‘s budget references that ―testing and evaluation of commercially 
available technologies will continue to support those in need of purchasing reliable 
equipment to detect and decontaminate CBR contaminants resulting from terrorist attacks 
on buildings and outdoor areas‖225. This is also in conflict with DHS Science and 
Technology‘s Test and Evaluation group, which is currently developing the National 
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), as well as a Chemical 
Security Analysis Center, a BioAgent detection program and several other programs 
related to CBRN threats
226
.  
 
VII. Observations and Recommendations 
 
In examining both key authorities and agency responsibilities related to homeland 
security across the government, it is clear that limitations in authority exist that appear to 
hinder the operational effectiveness of the department. Intelligence in particular stands 
out as an area where specific incidents, such as the case of Abdulmutallab, highlight an 
inability for DHS to take information and translate it into action, in part because of the 
limitations set by the Homeland Security Act.    
Even with the dollar thresholds and categorical eliminations set forth in this 
analysis, the capabilities budgeted under the homeland security federal umbrella are 
enormously spread out across many agencies. This analysis is not simply, hwever, about 
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throwing more organizations and money at DHS; some of the observations about the 
allocation of federal capabilities demonstrate a potential for removing some activities 
currently residing in DHS. Before recommendations are attempted, however a few key 
observations must be established: 
Due to the political environment in which the Department was created, it has 
been hindered by an inability to hold others accountable for success: In examining 
the political history of the department‘s formulation, there was a lack of specific 
coordinating authorities granted to the department; subsequently, other agencies, sensing 
the coming influx of money that would come with the reaction to 9/11, established their 
own programs dedicated to fighting terrorism. The FBI, in particular, reordered its 
priorities from traditional criminal investigations to those of terrorism. Also, because of 
the tendency to avoid federal regulations espoused by the Bush administration, there were 
no specific requirements set upon states and localities, the entities responsible for 
implementing many of the protective and preparatory activities that will help prevent an 
attack.  
Homeland security never was meant to be and never will be a federal 
responsibility contained exclusively inside DHS. In almost all of the areas examined, 
the efforts of states, localities, the private sector, academia and others are tantamount to 
achieving success. The federal government, by nature of the federalist political system 
designed in the United States, will never have the absolute ability to execute the 
homeland security mission itself, a mixture of prevention protection, mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery. The enormity of the homeland security mission is 
too broad for only one agency to handle alone, and the necessary reorganization of the 
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government in order to effective channel homeland security into one agency was 
predicted to take enormous planning over several years‘ time227 228 229(Newmann, 1998; 
CSIS, 2004; Donley, Pollard, 2002). 
 DHS rightly emphasized this very point when it created the notion of a 
―Homeland Security Enterprise‖ strategy during the inaugural QHSR. DHS defined the 
enterprise as ―the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local, 
tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners.‖ Because of this 
principle, any improvement to the Department of Homeland Security‘s effectiveness 
must take into account how the department will work with these diverse entities, who will 
most often be the first to respond in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster.    
 DHS is primarily an operational agency and should coalesce resources 
around operational capabilities – Through the capabilities of its major components, 
such as the Coast Guard, ICEE and NPPD (although a directorate, it holds many 
operational capabilities including federal building security and cyber incident response), 
DHS‘s core capabilities lie in the functions of screening people, identity and cargo; 
vetting persons and their identity, detection of hostile threats via technology and 
processes, and preparing, mitigating, responding to and recovering from incidents when 
they do occur. These are the core elements the original Homeland Security strategy laid 
out for DHS, and they are still applicable today.  
The department does retain capability in other areas such as investigatory 
functions, which include ICE, but this is not the department‘s niche. In looking at 
opportunities to better define authorities and agency functions that appropriately belong 
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in DHS, authorities and agency functions that promulgate success in these functional 
areas are ones that will be considered. 
 Research and Development in homeland security is especially spread out – A 
host of agencies contribute large amounts of money to the development of homeland 
security technology research and development. An area where this dissemination is 
particularly egregious is in the CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and 
Explosive) domain. No fewer than six agencies (Homeland Security, Defense, the 
National Science Foundation, Health and Human Services, Energy and the 
Environmental Protection Agency) all spend money on research and development. There 
are definite opportunities to rationalize the overall research footprint.  
 Poor management is also a problem - The Department has not helped its cause 
through weak management, ineffective attempts at measurement and a general lack of 
risk-based analysis in its decision-making. Although the department‘s own management 
failings and difficulties are not within the scope of this paper, they have to be briefly 
acknowledged. As mentioned previously, the department‘s transformation from 22 
components into a single agency has appeared on the GAO ―High-Risk list‖ ever since 
DHS was formed in 2003. The department has been primarily responsible for spectacular 
failures in both operations (Hurricane Katrina) and in capabilities development (the 
Secure Border Initiative technology program) due to poor leadership, management, 
relationships with contractors and other internal factors. The ability of the department to 
effectively utilize risk in its decision-making, for example, has been so poor that 
Congress dissolved the Department‘s Office of Risk Management and Analysis due to its 
lack of effectiveness
230
 (United States House of Representatives, 2011).  
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A risk-based approach to resource allocation is vital not just for operational 
reasons, but now, for fiscal ones as well. Like almost all agencies, Congress never 
enacted a budget for DHS in Fiscal Year 2011, meaning its funding was essentially 
flatlined. The budget passed for DHS in fiscal year 2012 is actually smaller than Fiscal 
Year 2011‘s by over $2 billion dollars, not including funding in the case of disasters 
(ibid). This restrictive fiscal environment, enforced by the Budget Control Act of 2011
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(United States House of Representatives, 2011), will likely continue for a number of 
years. Risk-based approaches to resource allocation loom more important as resources 
grow scarcer.       
IV. Recommendations 
 
   DHS was envisioned, much like prior government reorganizations such as the 
Department of Transportation, as ―holding companies‖ for amalgamations of preexisting 
entities
232
. But in the case of Transportation, for example, the coordinating function had 
an arguably less urgent objective - the efficiency and effectiveness of the intermodal 
transportation system, as opposed to protecting the United States from terrorist attacks. 
An important distinction between the four agencies that Meier characterizes as responses 
to a national priority (HHS, HUD, and the Departments of Energy and Transportation) is 
that none of these were formulated as singular responses to a seminal event, and therefore 
there was a significantly less compelling desire to quickly organize these departments. 
The closest case may be Energy, which was created in part due to the oil crises of the 
1970‘s, but these were a pair of lengthy events, as opposed to the immediate upheaval 
9/11 created. In other words, these agencies were not organized because of a ―policy 
67 
 
disruption.‖   
 Since DHS was organized by a policy disruption (an incredibly disruptive one, at 
that), there was an immediate outcry for the creation of a new bureaucracy, one of the 
alternatives identified as typical reactions to a policy window
233
. Unfortunately, there was 
an incredible amount of political calculation made in its formulation, and as a result the 
department‘s formulation, and the formulation of the government for Homeland Security 
overall, proved significantly less than optimal.         
In its Management Challenges report for 2009, GAO takes note of the 
department‘s attempt to integrate its ―non Homeland Security missions‖234 into its 
strategic plan. If we use Wilson‘s concept of autonomy as a theoretical basis, this is an 
incorrect approach. There are opportunities for DHS to request realignment of some 
programs that are superfluous to its core mission and request authorities and agencies that 
can grant it better autonomy. The problem here is not one of reshuffling the office chairs, 
in the sense that the DHS needs to assume the FBI or that FEMA needs to leave the 
department  The problem to solve is what agency is best organized and resourced to most 
effectively perform different homeland security functions?. The White House should re-
examine the National Strategy for Homeland Security and determine if the current 
configuration of agencies is most appropriately aligned to secure the nation. 
Unfortunately, there is a perception among some scholars that the time for re-
organization has ended
235
; however, this stands in contrast to other formulations of 
government agencies that were formulated and recalibrated over time, most notably the 
Department of Defense. The military apparatus underwent numerous, major structural 
realignments before the five fighting forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast 
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Guard) were organized under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified Combatant Commands 
that comprise the Department of Defense‘s structure today.  
In order to better rationalize the Department of Homeland Security‘s ability to 
carry out its mission, the following measures are recommended. These are not taken 
lightly, as they will require significant political will to carry out. It is suggested that these 
recommendations could take form under the rubric of a national homeland security 
strategy review. A justification of a homeland security review could take two forms, 
applied separately or in unison: the elimination of Osama Bin Laden and the need to 
better organize the government for efficiency due to budgetary pressures. The killing of 
Bin Laden can be considered a strategic opportunity to reassess the various threats to the 
homeland. The president can also propose a strategic review as a means of potential cost 
savings to the government in these tight fiscal times.  
While some of the following recommendations are oriented in reorganizations of 
existing entities, others are intended to close legislative gaps that currently expose 
vulnerabilities in DHS‘s ability to apply risk-based approach to homeland security across 
the nation. 
Reestablish the national strategy for homeland security as a follow-on to the 
next QHSR; pursuant to it, conduct a full-suite capabilities and requirements review 
of all federal government homeland security activity that is led by DHS; allocate 
resources to all homeland security activity holders based on this process: 
While there are opportunities for reorganization and better codification that will 
be examined in proceeding recommendations, the greatest unifying element to improve 
the mission of homeland security will be to coordinate budgets across all homeland 
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security entities based on a risk-driven strategy. DHS plans a national risk assessment as 
part of its second QHSR, slated to begin in January. It should pursue executive authority 
to conduct a government-wide review of homeland security capabilities pursuant to its 
missions, goals and objectives based on this risk assessment. This would potentially help 
the department coordinate an effective response to addressing gaps identified in its risk 
assessment and help to ensure that the 48 percent of federal dollars spent outside of DHS 
on homeland security are coordinated.    
Create a new Import-Export Security division of DHS that would consolidate 
the functions of Customs and Border Protection inspection of imports for security 
and safety and the regulation of exports for national security and other 
considerations by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security 
– Combining these organizations into one entity would mean administering very similar 
functions under one umbrella; there would also be an opportunity for efficiencies if 
inspectors can be used for both import and export purposes.    
Pass pending cyber legislation that consolidates DHS authorities to monitor 
and enforce compliance with federal cybersecurity standards and create standards 
for the private sector, especially in the critical infrastructure sectors; also create an 
independent a National Cybersecurity Agency (NCA) within DHS that centralizes 
protective capabilities and cyber law enforcement – Cyber attacks are, by many 
accounts, an underappreciated threat. The Internet security company Symantec, in 
response to the increasing volume and sophistication of cyber attacks, identified over 300 
million attempted cyber attacks in 2011
236
.  In the constantly adapting world of cyber 
threats, the current federal regulations related to information and technology security are 
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considered weak for the federal government and virtually nonexistent for the private 
sector, a troubling fact when it one considers that three-quarters of the critical 
information infrastructure is owned by private entities
237
. While CSIS criticized DHS for 
its failure to satisfy it key responsibilities for protecting critical infrastructure, it also cited 
uncertainty about its own authority as a factor in the department‘s inaction (ibid).  
Pending cybersecurity legislation would provide the protocols for information 
sharing about cyber threats and attacks between the government and the private sector, 
while limiting the amount of liability companies would undertake by releasing the 
data
238
. The one weakness of the bill as currently written is that it provides little 
enforcement authority for the Department to compel agencies to comply with standards, 
but frankly, this is less of a concern in the cyber arena than in physical terrorism or other 
criminal acts because the threat has already been recognized by the private sector. 
Generally speaking, companies have been calling for more sharing of information 
between the government and the private sector 
239
. 
However, in examining the current structure of capabilities in cybersecurity, DHS 
does not possess sufficient organizational resources to counter the rapidly expanding 
cyber threat theater. It is not, however, sufficient to grow parallel structures in DHS to 
those that already exist. The government has an opportunity to learn the lessons from 
previous failures and get the cybersecurity mission of the federal government closer to 
right, and it must do so under the guise of increasing restraints upon resources. Therefore, 
several significant organizational transfers should occur.  
First, the Infraguard program from the FBI, which establishes private-public 
partnership programs with state and local governments and the private sector for 
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infrastructure protection, should be transferred to DHS. In addition, the government 
should also transfer the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the FBI to 
DHS. Third, the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance, should be transferred to 
DHS as well, and this should be combined with the Electronic Crimes Task Forces of the 
Secret Service and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement‘s Cyber Crimes Center to 
create a national cyber forensics center. The bureau‘s programs focus on financial crimes 
and intellectual property; the Secret Service also focuses on financial crimes, while ICE‘s 
forensics scope a wide variety of crimes but focus on child pornography and sex 
trafficking and tourism.
240
  
The combined forensic capabilities of these three organizations would represent a 
significant combination of forensic staff and technology, while also representing an all-
source investigative center for cyber crimes.          
 Second, the Information Assurance Division of the National Security Agency, 
which holds responsibility for protection of national security data and information, should 
also be transferred to DHS. This would allow a cleaner delineation between the signals 
intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities of NSA (appropriate for a military agency) 
and the defensive elements of the Information Security Division (appropriate for a 
domestic security agency).  
In order to provide this organization sufficient authority, a National Cybersecurity 
Agency should be established that brings together all of these activities under a Director 
who is a direct report to the Secretary of Homeland Security. This organization would 
have three principal divisions - a cyber defense organization, a cyber investigations 
division, and a cyber mission support division, which would be responsible for public 
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awareness, transformational research and development, international outreach, cyber 
policy and other support functions.     
Transfer the operation and maintenance of the terrorism watchlist from the 
Terrorist Screening Center to the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis – In terms 
of intelligence, it is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive to create another 
intelligence bureaucracy in the United States. The consideration of a domestic 
intelligence agency, separate and distinct from the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
NSA, has been considered by policy think-tanks and scholars alike.
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 However, the 
ability to absorb of the FBI‘s domestic intelligence capabilities into DHS would be such a 
bureaucratic challenge that from a risk-based proposition, it would be unwise to pursue. 
In fact, this is not the problem at hand. As the previous examination showed, the current 
problem lies less with the government‘s ability to collect intelligence but rather to get the 
intelligence quickly into the Hands of front-line operators who can protect actually do 
something to protect against a catastrophic attack, as illustrated by the Abdumutallab. 
 Because DHS owns the responsibility for preventing acts of terrorism in the 
United States, it utilizes the terrorism watchlist for a wide variety of purposes: screening 
flight manifests on domestic flight through TSA‘s Secure Flight program, advising 
international airlines on allowing American-bound passengers to board flights (Customs 
and Border Protection‘s Immigration Advisory Program), and screening criminals in the 
United States for inclusion on the watchlist (Immigration and Customs Enforcement‘s 
Secure Communities Program), among others.  
Because of these operational capabilities, DHS represents the best location for 
information to be quickly integrated into operational protocols. It also owns the 
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mechanisms for communicating with state and local law enforcement, which obviously 
can deploy resources the quickest if a threat is already within the United States. 
Obviously, DHS is not the only recipient of terrorism screening information (the FBI and 
the State Dept. uses it for visa requests as well). In the case of State, however, DHS 
already is a checkpoint in the visa application process through its Visa Security 
program
243
 (Government Accountability Office, 2010a). 
The FBI does communicate with state and local law enforcement, but this responsibility 
can be easily assumed by DHS within its existing work.  
   Examine consolidation government-wide of federal resources dedicated to 
the protection of physical infrastructure to an expanded Federal Protective Service 
– Federal agencies dedicate enormous resources to physical security; those agencies 
identified include DHS, DOD, Energy, the U.S. Forest Service in the Department of 
Agriculture and the US Marshalls Service in the Department of Justice. Because this type 
of physical security is a DHS core capability, it makes a great deal of sense for these 
various programs to be potentially consolidated into the Federal Protective Service inside 
of DHS. Many of these security officers are contractors; in fact, within DHS, the vast 
majority of the Federal Protective Service‘s security guards are contractors244  
In addition, various branches of the military utilize contract security guards 
currently to augment security forces deployed overseas
245
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. There are potential 
efficiencies garnered just by consolidating these contracts, as well as establishing core 
training and vetting (background checks, etc.) for contract security personnel. Agencies‘ 
inability to detect criminal histories on the part of security contractors has been cited in 
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numerous reports 
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(GAO, 2010; GAO, 2006, Department of Defense Office of 
the Inspector General, 2009). A more unified process could help correct these flaws.   
The Department of Homeland Security should have broader statutory 
authority to establish risk-based standards for critical infrastructure: Because of the 
size of the task and the inherently federalized nature of our government, DHS cannot 
control the security operations for the security of every nuclear power plant, bridge and 
skyscraper. But what the department can do and do effectively is enforce a unified set of 
standards for securing these aspects of our critical infrastructure. Currently, the 
department still relies on a fair measure of voluntary compliance from the private sector. 
DHS should possess the ability, based on risk analysis, to determine what threats are most 
probable (both natural and man-made). It should also be given the authority to enforce 
and systematically measure those standards.  
The Department‘s Protective Security Advisors program, currently a cadre of civil 
servants, would require additional resources to monitor compliance with regulations.  As 
of December 2010, only 93 staff was responsible for 74 districts within the 50 states and 
Puerto Rico.
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The federal government should consolidate its national preparedness grant 
programs such as port security, transit security and HHS-based hospital 
preparedness into a DHS-led grants program that focuses on critical infrastructure 
vulnerabilities to all hazards. The department should lead and conduct a real 
national preparedness assessment that takes into account the particular risk factors 
of a given locality, then establish capability standards to mitigate those risks. Then, 
only allocate grant funds that aim to address gaps or maintain standards. 
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Recommendation three has close linkages with recommendation two. As 
previously noted, over $40 billion in grant monies have been distributed by DHS or its 
predecessor agencies since 2001, much of which has been uniformly allocated to states 
and municipalities without accountability. In addition, other agencies such as Health and 
Human Services administer grants for hospital preparedness. If risk-based standards can 
be established for the 18 critical infrastructure sectors, then preparedness grant monies 
should be allocated towards the preparedness of these specific sectors.  
Under this framework, grant allocations should be done with a zero-based budget 
mindset; in other words, funding is exclusively contingent upon risk, rather than any 
formula that guarantees a percentage of funding to states. The assessments should 
determine the level of risk, and develop a plan established to mitigate the risk and then 
maintain, as necessary, the level of resilience against the risk. While no one is completely 
certain of the overall level of preparedness of each of these sectors, a systematic effort 
would at least help to ensure that future dollars are spent more wisely. This would also 
ensure that there is a sufficient pool of resources associated with the creation of 
regulations governing critical infrastructure, so that the private sector is not financially 
burdened by these regulations.  
While grants themselves would be consolidated and administered under DHS, the 
department should empanel interagency review of grant proposals that involve federal 
agencies with subject-matter expertise, such as HHS, the Department of the Interior (for 
national monuments), the Department of the Treasury (for the banking and financial 
sectors) and the DOD (for the defense industrial sector).  
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Establish a WMD Directorate within DHS that consolidates the programs 
focused on CBRN protections; any programs focused on lower-impact explosives, 
such as the NPPD Office of Bombing Prevention, should be eliminated and 
capabilities transferred to the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives – Several small programs exist in DHS in the CBRN arena 
that all operate with their own management and business processes, as well as others in 
the Departments of Energy, Justice and Health and Human Services. These capabilities 
focused on the prevention and protection against catastrophic threats should be 
consolidated into a single directorate. Specifically, this would bring together from DHS 
the following components: the Office of Health Affairs, the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office and the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program from the 
National Protection and Programs Directorate. It would also bring together the 
Department of Energy‘s Nuclear Incident Support Teams and its security funding for 
protecting nuclear power plants, as well as the EPA‘s Decontamination programs. 
Because the Department of Justice‘s Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate is 
primarily investigatory in nature, it shall remain housed there. Other capabilities in 
CBRNE that are research-and-development focused shall also be consolidated within 
DHS, but within a different organizational structure, defined below. 
In addition to the elements that would authority or consolidate organizations into 
DHS, there are opportunities for streamlining DHS operations by removing certain 
programs.   
Remove the BioWatch biological pathogen detection program from DHS and 
place it within the Department of Health and Human Services’ Center for Disease 
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Control and Prevention – DHS once managed the program (Project BioShield) that 
maintained the critical vaccines for dangerous pathogens such as anthrax, but lobbied and 
eventually received permission from Congress to turn the operation and maintenance of 
the program to the CDC, because it felt that HHS could better manage the vaccine 
stockpile. A similar logic follows with biodetection; HHS has better established 
relationships with state and local health officials and can utilize those relationships to 
make swift, informed decisions to move from a positive detection of a pathogen to the 
deployment of a vaccine or other countermeasure. 
Consolidate basic research for homeland security functions into the National 
Science Foundation, and applied research into DHS Science and Technology - 
Because the National Science Foundation has the scientific breadth of a wide variety of 
disciplines, such as biology, chemistry, engineering, computer science, and others, it 
represents an ideal location to target homeland security basic research that can lead to 
technological breakthroughs. The NSF already breaks out its basic research into a 
homeland security category when it submits its budget in order to allow the OMB to 
develop its homeland security budgetary exhibit; the NSF could develop a Homeland 
Security Center of Excellence for which it solicits proposals. Medical research, because 
of statute, would still reside in the National Institutes of Health. The significant resources 
and infrastructure of the NIH provide arguably the best environment for this type of 
research. In contrast, DHS Science and Technology should focus on applied research that 
gathers specific requirements from the operational components of the DHS, with the 
exception of cybersecurity, where the practitioners of cyber defense are often those who 
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are also best equipped to identify innovation. The newly created National Cybersecurity 
Agency would house cyber R&D.  
 The specific research DOD and DOE conduct in anti-terrorism technologies 
would be transferred to DHS, as well as the three programs identified by NSF as targeted 
cyber research areas (Moving Target Defense; Tailored Trustworthy Spaces and Cyber 
Economic Initiatives). Basic research dollars expended by S&T would be made available 
to the NSF for competitive grants.  
   
X. Conclusion 
 
 In the challenging economic environment we now face, other national priorities 
may loom greater in the political and policy environment we currently occupy than 
homeland security, such as job creation and entitlement reform. It may seem like an 
inopportune moment to address the problems of homeland security, but very few events 
have the ability to impact the political and policy environments the way a terrorist attack 
on American soil can. While not all of the recommendations provided herein are geared 
towards the prevention of terrorism, many of them are and all of them represent distinct 
threats to American security. One only is reminded of the need to tap the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve before Hurricane Katrina‘s landfall to identify the interconnections 
between natural disasters and the U.S security environment. The policy window for this 
type of effort will prove challenging, but it can be done within the context of a broader 
effort towards a more efficient government and a need to review our approach in the 
wake of another seminal event (the killing of Bin Laden). On the budgetary side, the 
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Obama administration began an initiative last spring to look at an optimization of the 
government; only in early 2012 has it requested to reinstate authority to actually 
consolidate agencies 
251
(Landler, Lowrey, 2012). The challenge would be finding the 
proper ―policy window‖ in which to structure such a diverse set of changes as proposed; 
organizational changes can certainly be entertained as part of a general restructuring of 
government if they can be seen as providing cost savings.  
Changing governmental authorities is another issue entirely; finding the political 
capital to institute a change, such as broader authority over regulations to critical 
infrastructure that could result in more governmental power, is daunting at best. Short of 
another catastrophic event acting as a catalyst (something no one hopes for), 
infrastructure improvements for security could be incentivized as part of a modernization 
effort to bring deficient physical infrastructure up to date - the concept of an 
―infrastructure bank‖ has been a policy proposal often touted by the Obama 
administration and members of Congress as a means of economic stimulus
252
 (Plumer, 
2011).        
Regardless of the tactical considerations that would effectuate such changes, the 
need to adjust the DHS should be viewed as a priority. The agency, as currently designed, 
requires some additional ―nourishment‖ in the form of authorities and other 
organizations‘ capabilities to achieve optimization. In addition, some ―addition by 
subtraction‖ can occur if the department sheds some of the functions where its knowledge 
and capabilities are limited. If the department is allowed to remain in its current state, 
there is a real chance that it will be permanently ensconced in a kind of stymied 
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adolescence – mature beyond the initial chaos of its infancy but unable to make the 
necessary leaps to adulthood.  
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